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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
PIaintiff7Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20050613-CA 
ISIAH B O ' C A G E VOS, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF O F APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL S T A T E M E N T A N D N A T U R E OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from his conviction for murder, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under the pour-over 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
S T A T E M E N T OF ISSUES 
AND S T A N D A R D S OF REVIEW 
Issue No . 1: Was defendant's pre-trial attorney constitutionally ineffective when he 
encouraged defendant to admit his involvement in a witnessed shooting early on as part of 
a strategy to advance a credible claim of self-defense? .'..•• 
Standard of Review: "When a trial court has previously ruled on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the issues raised present mixed questions of law and fact/5 State 
v. Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222, ^ 16 ,112 P.3d 1252 (internal quotation marks and citation 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
omitted), cert, denied, 125 P.3d 102 (Utah 2005). The trial court's findings are reviewed for 
clear error and its legal conclusions for correctness. Id. 
Issue No. 2: Are Miranda warnings necessary where defense counsel initiates an 
interview with police, defendant has an opportunity to consult with counsel before giving a 
statement, and counsel is present throughout the interview? 
Standard of Review: On appeal, "the trial court's factual findings underlying the 
denial of a motion to suppress" are reviewed for "clear error, while conclusions of law are 
reviewed for correctness." State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following constitutional provisions are attached at Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. V; 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 26,2004, defendant was charged with murder, a first degree felony. Rl-
3. Five days after his arrest, on his attorney's advice and in his attorney's presence, 
defendant waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the killing, but claimed that he had 
acted in self-defense. SfeeR258:42; R259:8-13, 20-30. y 
Defendant retained new counsel, who moved to suppress defendant's confession, 
alleging that it had been taken in violation of Miranda, was not knowingly or voluntarily 
given, and was based "on grossly ineffective legal advice." R64. After holding an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. R76, 99,115-20. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A jury convicted defendant as charged. R167-84, 189-91, 206.\ The trial court 
imposed a five-years-to-life prison term, with a consecutive one-year firearm enhancement. 
R215-16; R262:10. Defendant timely appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which 
transferred the case to this Court. See 215, 222, 254. . > 
, . STATEMENT OF FACTS2 , 
The shooting 
Drivers were startled on October 21,2004, to see a shooting near the intersection of 
700 North and Star Crest Drive in Salt Lake City. R260:40-43,107-10,149-50. Itwas about 
4:30 p.m. and still light out. R260:49, 107, 114, 149. 
Melissa Adams was waiting to turn left onto Star Crest Drive from 700 North when 
she saw a green car pull up to the curb and the driver get out. R260:107. The driver walked 
to the back of his car, towards a pedestrian walking down the street. R260:107-08. As 
Adams started to turn, she saw the pedestrian pull out a gun and shoot at the driver, who by 
this time had reached the midpoint of his car trunk. R260:108. The two men were about five 
to six feet apart, but it looked like the driver was starting to retreat back around his car and 
!The trial court sealed all information in the record containing identifying . 
information of individual jurors, because during trial, defendant and others inquired about 
juror ingress and egress from the courthouse, and because jurors had voiced concerns that 
defendant, and possibly others, appeared to be writing down their names. See R209. 
Thus, the verdict forms are in a sealed envelope. SeeR206. 
2Unless otherwise stated, the following facts are recited in the light most favorable 
to the jury verdict. See State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, \ 2, 6 P.3d 1116. 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the pedestrian was pursuing him. R260:108-09,117-18. As Adams completed her turn, 
she heard four to five shots. R260:108. 
About a block north of the shooting, Adams saw the shooter—through her rear view 
mirror—get into a teal Ford Explorer. R260:109, 119. Adams returned to the scene of the 
shooting to check on the driver of the green car. R260:l 10. On her way back, she passed 
the Explorer. R260:109-10. She looked for a plate number, but the Explorer had no plates. 
Id. When Adams arrived back at the scene, she found the driver lying unresponsive on a 
driveway. R260:110-11. She called 911 on her cellphone. R260:110-ll. : 
Jenness Wood also saw the shooting. R260:44-45. She was turning right onto 700 
North from Star Crest Drive when she heard "[p]ops . . . like a cap gun." R260:40. She 
looked around to see two people in a driveway "running between the cars, onto the lawn, and 
the one in the lead had turned around and was about 4 to 6 feet away from the one chasing 
him." R260:40. The man being pursued was "larger" and had his "hands up." R260:41. 
The pursuer was pointing a gun at the larger man. R260:41 -42. Ms. Wood drove on because 
she "couldn't believe" that she had just seen a shooting. R260:42-43. She later called police 
when she learned that someone had been killed.3 R260:43. 
3
 There were several other witnesses to the shooting, see R259:17 ("seven or 
eight"), but only three testified: Melissa Adams, Jenness Wood, and Robert Knudsen, 
who was called by the defense, see R260:148-55. Knudsen saw only part of the 
altercation. R260:148. Knudsen was stopped at the light, about three cars back, on the 
comer of 700 North and Star Crest Drive. R260:150. When the light turned green and no 
one moved, Knudsen turned into the left lane to go around. Id. He saw two men, one 
chasing the other. Id. Knudsen slowed and watched in his rear view mirror. According 
to Knudsen, the pursuer lifted his arm and Knudsen could see the butt of the gun, but not 
the barrel. Id. The other man, who was larger, had his hands raised above his head. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The scene 
The scene was secured by the time homicide detective Cordan Parks arrived, between 
5:10 and 5:15 p.m. R260:74-75. The victim, later identified as Jeffrey Maestas, lay under 
a sheet in the driveway where he had fallen. R260:73-75. He had died from four .22 caliber 
bullet wounds—two to the front of his body and two to the back. R26Q:61, 69. Each of the 
bullet wounds was potentially fatal. R260:62-66. 
Police found no weapons on Maestas's person, but found a wooden baseball bat on 
the front right passenger floor of his green Ford Taurus. R260:75-80. The Taurus was still 
running, with the keys in the ignition and both front windows down. R260:77-80/ 
The police suspect defendant 
Although no single witness to the shooting could identify defendant as the gunman, 
defendant was a suspect within an hour of Detective Parks' arrival on the scene. R260:74~ 
75, 86-87. Defendant's former little league football coach informed police at the scene that 
he had seen defendant a few minutes after 4:30 p.m., walking south on Star Crest Drive 
toward 700 North. R260:51-53. Defendant was then only about a block away from the 
shooting scene. R260:51-53. Gang detectives also gave Detective Parks information 
suggesting that defendant, a member of the Black Mafia Gangsters ("BMG"), might be the 
shooter. R260:82-86. Based on that information, detectives immediately tried to contact 
defendant, but no one was at his home and the car was gone. R260:86. 
R260:151-52. Knudsen did not hear any shots and drove on. R260:152. He called police 
after he saw the news at home. Id. 
5 
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Meanwhile, police began looking for the teal Ford Explorer that the shooter had 
entered immediately after the killing. R260:87. The gang squad found it the following 
morning, at about 1:30 a.m., at the owner's address. R260:87. At about 4:00 a.m., police 
found the owner, Anthony Ferguson, and his girlfriend staying at a motel. R260:89. 
Ferguson told police that defendant was the person who had "come jumped into his Ford 
Explorer" the day before at Star Crest and 700 North. R260:90. Based on Ferguson's 
statement, police broadcast an attempt to locate defendant.4 R260:89. 
Defendant retains counsel, turns himself in> and gives a statement 
Later that day, defendant's attorney, John Bucher, arranged for defendant to turn 
himself in at Bucher's office. R260:91, 98. Police arrested defendant and booked him into 
jail, but did not interview him. R260:91, 98-99. Five days later, on October 27,2004, Mr. 
Bucher arranged for Detective Parks to interview defendant at the jail. R260:92-93. 
Defendant told Detective Parks that he shot Maestas in self-defense. R260:93-95. 
Defendant said that his house had recently been shot at three times and that two weeks 
earlier, Maestas, a member of the Salt Lake Posse Gang, had admitted to shooting at 
defendant's house and had threatened to kick open defendant's door, shoot his mother in the 
face, and kill defendant. R260:100-01. 
4Although subpoenaed, Ferguson failed to appear at trial and therefore did not 
testify. R260:123-24. His identification of defendant, however, came in without 
objection through Detective Parks' testimony, R260:87-90, 103-04, and later through 
defendant's own testimony, R261:201. 
6 
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Defendant told Parks that on the day of the shooting, Maestas had made a "U" turn, 
pulled over, and threatened to kill defendant. R260:102. Defendant then claimed that 
Maestas reached down towards the floorboard as if to grab something, jumped out of his car, 
and again threatened defendant. R260:102. Defendant alleged that because he was afraid 
for his life, he pulled out his gun and told Maestas to stop. R26Q:103. According to 
defendant, when Maestas continued to approach and threaten to kill him, defendant pulled 
the trigger until he had emptied his gun. R260:103. 
Defendant admitted to Detective Parks that he had fled the scene in Anthony 
Ferguson's teal Ford Explorer. R260:95. Defendant admitted knowing Ferguson, but 
claimed he appeared only coincidentally and had nothing to do with the shooting. Id. 
The defense at trial 
Defendant's trial testimony was largely consistent with his statement to Detective 
Parks. Defendant also called several witnesses, including his mother, and produced 
photographs of bullet holes and shell casings, to corroborate that in the weeks preceding the 
murder, his house had been shot at three times. R260:143-42,156; Defense Exs. 11-17,21, 
24,25. One of those shootings, which was reported to police, left several bullet holes in and 
around the headboard of defendant'smother's bed. R260:133-37; Defense Exs. 11,13,16. 
Defendant and his witnesses also testified that Maestas had a reputation for being 
violent and carrying a firearm. R260:162; R261:203,223. According to defendant and one 
witness, about two weeks before the shooting, Maestas displayed a black semiautomatic and 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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told defendant that he was going to "smoke" whoever had shot at Maestas's house. 
R261:180-81, 183. ^ - I -
Some defense witnesses said they were privy to a telephone conversation soon 
afterwards, in which Maestas accused defendant ofshooting at his house. R260:130-41,160, 
182. Although defendant denied it, Maestas threatened that if it happened again, Maestas 
was "going to stomp your door down and shoot your p ^ i n g mom—your mom in the 
f***ing face" and was "going to kill you when I see you." R260:160; R261:194. 
Another witness testified that a little over a month before the shooting, Maestas told 
him that Maestas was going to kill defendant for shooting up his house. R261:225. Maestas 
showed this witness two guns. R261:225. The witness relayed this conversation to 
defendant. R261:226. About three days later, defendant's house was shot at. Id. Maestas 
told the witness that he was the one who had shot up defendant's house. Id. The witness 
also conveyed this conversation to defendant. Id. o : 
Defendant claimed at trial that on the day of the shooting, he was waiting for his 
girlfriend at the bus stop near 700 North and Star Crest Drive, when Maestas drove by, 
talking on his cell phone. R261:195-96. Maestas saw defendant, "got excited," hung up, and 
made a U turn.5 R261:196. Defendant testified that he believed that Maestas was going to 
shoot him and so began walking away. R261:197. According to defendant, Maestas pulled 
5At trial, the parties stipulated that a long-time friend of Maestas told police that he 
was the person talking to Maestas on the phone at the time and that Maestas suddenly 
interrupted their conversation with, "Here's a n***er, I'll call you right back." R260:130-
31. 
s Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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up to the curb, with his passenger window down, and began yelling, "Oh, yes, you are that 
mother f***er. I got you now, yeah, bitch." R261:197. 
Defendant claimed that he began walking the other way, but that Maestas "slammed 
the car in park," reached under his seat, jumped out of the car, and "came running around, 
back of that car, where I couldn't see his hand." R261:197. Defendant stated that Maestas 
had his hand behind his back. R261:197. Defendant testified that when Maestas reached the 
middle of his car trunk, defendant pulled out his gun and yelled, "Stop, stop." R261:197-98. 
According to defendant, when Maestas saw the gun, he did not stop, but yelled, "I am 
going to kill you," and "charged" at defendant with "his head down." R261:198. Defendant 
stated that he still could not see Maestas's hand and so started pulling the trigger. R261:198. 
Defendant claimed that as he fired, both he and Maestas moved in opposite directions. 
R261:198-99. Defendant said that he did not believe he had hit Maestas because he did not 
see any blood and Maestas had kept moving. R261:199-200. 
Defendant explained that he started to run away, but then saw Ferguson making a left 
hand turn at the intersection. R261:201. Defendant flagged him down and jumped into his 
Ford Explorer. Id. 
Defendant testified that he did not know until later, when he saw the news, that he had 
killed Maestas. R261:201-02. He immediately destroyed the gun and threw it in a dumpster. 
R261:202. The following day, he made arrangements through his mother and his attorney 
to turn himself in. Id. Defendant testified that four or five days later, he voluntarily gave a 
statement to Detective Parks, with his lawyer present. Id. 
9 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue 1: Defendant claims that Mr. Bucher was constitutionally ineffective for 
advising him to give a statement to the police so early in the proceedings. Defendant has not 
carried his heavy burden under Strickland to show that counsel performed deficiently and 
that his counsel's performance prejudiced him. First, the trial court found that Mr. Bucher's 
advice was "part of [a] cogent and joint strategy of [defendant] and his attorney to argue that 
Maestas had been killed in self-defense." Defendant has not shown that that finding is 
clearly erroneous. Mr. Bucher testified that when he advised defendant, he knew that 
witnesses could identify his client as the shooter, that the victim initiated the confrontation 
that led to the shooting, and that the victim had a substantiated history of threatening 
defendant. Based on that knowledge, Mr. Bucher reasonably determined that defendant's 
best strategy was to claim self-defense and that an early statement to that effect would 
enhance the credibility of that defense at trial. By making the statement to police, defendant 
could (and did) testify in line that statement, thereby showing the jury that he had nothing to 
hide, he had cooperated with police from the beginning, and he was honest and forthright. 
Second, defendant also has not shown that his counsel's advice, even if objectively 
deficient, prejudiced him. Under the circumstances of this case, self-defense was the best 
defense counsel could have run. Defendant has not shown that there was a reasonable 
probability of a better outcome if his counsel had instead opted to present an identity defense. 
10 
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Issue 2: Defendant contends that his statement should have been suppressed because 
he did not voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently waive his Miranda rights. Specifically, 
defendant argues that he was not fully advised of his Miranda rights and that he did not 
affirmatively waive them before giving a statement. : 
According to Miranda and the overwhelming majority of courts to address the issue, 
counsel's presence throughout a custodial interrogation obviates the need for Miranda 
warnings. Defendant, therefore, has shown no Miranda violation. Even if he had, any 
violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where police did not need the statement 
to prove that defendant shot and killed the victim and where defendant used the statement 
to advance his self-defense claim. 
'. ARGUMENT : • 
.:;.;•:• POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT 
CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE FOR ADVISING DEFENDANT 
TO ADMIT TO A WITNESSED SHOOTING EARLY ON, AS PART OF 
A STRATEGY TO ADVANCE A CREDIBLE SELF-DEFENSE CLAIM6 
Defendant argues that Mr. Bucher's pre-trial representation in advising him to waive 
his Miranda rights and to admit to the shooting early on fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Defendant asserts that Mr. Bucher did not adequately investigate before 
advising him to give a statement to police, nor did he ensure that defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Br. Aplt. 13-25. Defendant alleges that Mr. Bucher's 
6This point responds to Points I, II, and III of defendant's brief. 
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performance in advising him was also deficient because it usurped his right to decide the 
objectives of the litigation and it violated his attorney-client privilege. Id at 14-18. 
Defendant argues that prejudice should be presumed in this case because Mr. Bucher's 
advice either created a conflict of interest or constructively denied him the assistance of 
counsel. Id. at 25-32. Defendant alternatively argues that Mr. Bucher's alleged deficient 
performance prejudiced him. Id. at 34-39. 
As explained below, defendant has not met his heavy burden under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, as the trial court found below, Mr. Bucher did not 
perform objectively unreasonably in advising defendant to give a statement to police. Rather, 
Mr. Bucher's advice was "part of [a] cogent and joint strategy of [defendant] and his attorney 
to argue that Maestas had been killed in self-defense." Rl 17 (Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, attached as Addendum B). 
Defendant has not shown that that finding is clearly erroneous. 
Second, defendant has not shown prejudice. Contrary to his arguments, Mr. Bucher's 
advice did not create a conflict of interest, nor did it amount to a constructive denial of the 
assistance of counsel. Thus, prejudice is not presumed. Defendant has not shown that but 
for his counsel's advice, there was a reasonable likelihood of a better outcome for him. 
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A. Evidence presented at motion to suppress hearing.7 / 
Detective Parks, John Bucher, and defendant testified at the motion to suppress 
hearing regarding the circumstances surrounding defendant's statement. See R259. 
Detective Parks testified that attorney John Bucher called him the afternoon of October 22, 
2004, and said that he represented defendant. R259:7-8, 21. Mr. Bucher arranged for 
defendant to turn himself in at his office at about 4:30 p.m. that day. R259:7,21. Police did 
not question defendant when they arrested him, because Mr. Bucher expressly forbade it. 
R259:7-8. ., :• < v::,}:-\ .;*-:,• .;/• -r.',,.'., . /;-.y,., ;r: ;-
Mr. Bucher talked to Detective Parks either at the time of surrender or soon after, 
because he "wanted to know more facts about the thing." R259:22. Detective Parks told Mr. 
Bucher that Anthony Ferguson, the driver of the teal Ford Explorer, could identify defendant. 
R259:10-12, 22. Ferguson had told police that he saw defendant "fighting" with Maestas, 
although Ferguson claimed to have been unaware that there was a gun involved. R259:11-
12. Detective Parks also told Bucher that there were other eyewitnesses to the shooting. 
R259:10-13. Detective Parks could not specifically recall whether he told Mr. Bucher that 
these other witnesses could identify defendant, but thought that he "probably" had. R2 5 9:10. 
Mr. Bucher testified, however, that Detective Parks mentioned "one or two" other 
witnesses in addition to Ferguson, "but did not - 1 mean, I think he told me that they were 
witnesses to the shooting, but he did not tell me whether or not they knew who [defendant] 
7Unless otherwise stated, the following facts from the suppression hearing are 
stated in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See State v. Earl, 2004 UT 
Appl63,1fl ,n. l ,92P.3dl67. 
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was. Only one person knew who [defendant] was, and that was the man that - the boy that 
picked him up at the crime scene." R259:22. Mr. Bucher nevertheless testified that he had 
assumed that more than one person could identify defendant as the shooter. R259:28. 
Over the next few days, Mr. Bucher received and reviewed "some initial discovery." 
R259:25, 28. Mr. Bucher also talked "very much" with defendant. R259:28. Mr. Bucher 
learned from defendant that "there were people at the scene" and that the history between 
defendant and the victim went back several months. R259:29-30. 
As Mr. Bucher explained at the suppression hearing, based on what he knew at the 
time, he believed defendant's best defense would be self-defense, imperfect self-defense, "or 
some sort of psychological defense." R259:23,30. Mr. Bucher knew police did not have the 
murder weapon and considered this "a small defect" in their case. R259:23. "But back then, 
upon hearing the history of the victim and [defendant] and the identification of the witnesses, 
I came to the conclusion that this case should not be approached as a - as a 'who dunnit,' as 
an identification case, but that it must be approached another way . . . . " Id. "So pretty early 
in the thing," Mr. Bucher "wanted to make a statement and tell the detective the history of 
the victim and [defendant]." Id. Mr. Bucher also testified that he hoped defendant's 
statement would help him negotiate a plea agreement with the prosecution. R259:25. 
Mr. Bucher contacted the prosecutor and said he wanted to have defendant 
interviewed because he believed he had a good self-defense claim. R259:9; Defense Ex. 1. 
The prosecutor told Mr. Bucher to contact Detective Parks to set up the interview. Id. 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Consequently, on October 27,2004, Mr. Bticher called Detective Parks to tell him that 
defendant wanted to make a statement. R259:8,14,19. Mr. Bucher told Detective Parks that 
"identity wasn't an issue, that the case had self-defense aspects of it that he wanted to get out, 
and [defendant] wanted to make a statement, and they were going to claim a defense of 
imperfect self-defense . . . " R259:19. Mr. Bucher also explained that he hoped to establish 
a good relationship with the prosecutor to facilitate settling the case. R259:19. 
Mr. Bucher and Detective Parks met in the jail parking lot. R259:10. Mr. Bucher told 
the detective not to ask any questions about the gun. Id. Mr. Bucher explained that the gun 
had been destroyed and that it could not be used in any more crimes. Id. Mr. Bucher knew 
that defendant did not want to talk about the gun because it might implicate him or his family 
members in an additional crime. R259:29. * 
Defendant was "uncomfortable" giving a statement to police, although Mr. Bucher 
had previously discussed it with him. R259:24-25. Mr. Bucher asked the detective to leave 
while he talked to defendant. R259:26. Mr. Bucher and defendant then had a "lengthy 
conversation concerning the nature of this case and the way that [Mr. Bucher] thought it had 
to be done." Id. Mr. Bucher explained that he had come "to the conclusion early on that 
[defendant] was in true fear of this Maestas, that he didn't go hunting Maestas; that the 
aggressor, it was always the indications it was the victim." R259:27. Mr. Bucher "felt that 
[defendant] was telling [him] the truth," and "was a credible witness." Id. "And there were 
other credible facts to backup his story, so [Mr. Bucher] thought that was the way to 
approach this case because [defendant] was credible." Id. 
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Defendant questioned Mr. Bucher's approach and at one point asked whether they 
could "question [defendant's] identity and still do a self-defense or modified self-defense." 
R259:27. Mr. Bucher explained that the two defenses were "inconsistent" and that "[w]hen 
you get a jury to give us the time of day, if we're going to modify that it was self-defense, 
we got to be completely truthful." Id. 
When asked if he had to talk defendant into making the statement, Mr. Bucher replied, 
"It was close, it was close. He did not - he didn't see my point of view on the thing, but I 
took that as his lack of experience in this kind of thing," because defendant had "never been 
involved in anything like this." Id. r. ! ; ^ , 
After talking with defendant, Mr. Bucher invited Detective Parks back in. R259:12. 
Mr. Bucher advised defendant of his constitutional right to remain silent and told the 
detective that defendant wished to waive that right. R259:15-16. Detective Parks did not 
read defendant's Miranda rights to him because his "attorney was present and represented 
him on that matter." R259:13. Defendamt then gave his statement. See id. : 
Defendant testified that he initially refused to give a statement to police, but that Mr. 
Bucher "kept insisting" that he do so. R259:33. Defendant said that Mr. Bucher told him 
that police "had a substantial amount of evidence against him" and that a statement would 
be the only way to obtain any "benefits." R259:33-34. Defendant acknowledged that he 
knew that Anthony Ferguson could identify him both from "paperwork" that he had received 
when he was booked into jail and from his own personal experience: "That's the one that 
I knew for a fact, that I was a hundred percent sure .in my mind, then I believe that Mr. 
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Bucher told me that there other witnesses." R259:36. Although defendant could not recall 
whether Mr. Bucher "specially" told him that there were other witnesses who could identify 
him, he knew there were "a bunch of other people around at [the] time." R259:36-37. 
Defendant finally stated that while he did not "want to talk about the whole situation," Mr. 
Bucher "persuaded" him to do so. R259:37. 
Based on all the testimony, the trial court found that defendant's statement to 
Detective Parks was "made as part of the cogent and joint strategy of [defendant] and his 
attorney to argue that Maestas had been killed in self-defense, or that at most, [defendant] 
was guilty of manslaughter, arising from an imperfect use of deadly force in circumstances 
not amounting to reasonable self-defense." Rl 17. The trial court also found that before 
defendant gave his statement, defendant's "Miranda warnings were waived by Mr. Bucher, 
and he remained present with his client for the duration and totality of the interview by 
Detective Parks." Rl 17. The trial court concluded that defendant had not shown that Mr. 
Bucher's performance was either deficient or prejudicial, particularly where "there was a 
tactical and rational basis for his actions in advising [defendant]." Rl 19. 
B. The Strickland standard. 
To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, defendant must "show that counsel's 
performance was deficient" and that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A failure to establish either prong 
defeats the defendant's claim. Seeid. 
17 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. Deficient performance prong. 
To satisfy the first Strickland prong, defendant "must show that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. As the 
Strickland court recognized, "[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any 
given case." Id. at 689. Indeed, "[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not 
defend a particular client in the same way." Id. 
Strickland also recognized that "[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess 
counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence" and "all too easy for a court, 
examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular 
act or omission of counsel was unreasonable." Id. at 689. Thus, a "fair assessment of 
attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight." Id. This means that counsel's performance must be judged based on his or her 
"perspective at the time." Id. 
It is precisely because of the "distorting effects of hindsight," that this Court has said 
that it "will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed 
those choices might appear in retrospect." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,465 (Utah App. 
1993). Rather, a defendant must "overcome the strong presumption that counsel's 
performance fell 'within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance' and that 
'under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy.'"" 
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 
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2. Prejudice prong. 
The second Strickland prong can be met "only by showing there is a reasonable 
probability that 'but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different."' Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 466 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). The 
burden is on the defendant to prove both Strickland prongs and to assure that the record on 
appeal is adequate to support his claim. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ff 16-19, 12 
P.3d92. ••''••:^S'^'h::[:/-'y-- - - ' • , 
C. Counsel performed objectively reasonably in advising defendant to talk to police. 
1. Counsel had a legitimate strategic reason for his advice. 
Defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails, first, because he has not overcome the "strong 
presumption" that counsel's conduct fell "within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance" and that "under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (additional quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
The primary thrust of defendant's claim is that his counsel was ineffective for 
advising him to give a statement to police so soon after he was arrested, without first 
completing an adequate investigation. See Br. Aplt. 13-14, 18-20, 23-25. In support, 
defendant asserts that "[n]ot one witness called by the State at trial identified [defendant] as 
being involved in the shooting." Br. Aplt. 19. Implicit in defendant's argument is that his 
counsel might not have recommended making a statement if he had adequately investigated. 
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"Whether or not to recommend making a statement [to police] is a strategic decision 
which is only deficient if it is unreasonable 'from counsel's perspective at the time5 he made 
the recommendation." Smith v. Rogerson, 111 F.3d 569, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). See also Knappenberger v. State, 672 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Ark. 
1984) (in assessing counsel's advice to give pre-trial statement to police, "what counsel knew 
at the time he advised [defendant] is pertinent, not what evidence the state eventually decided 
to present at trial"). The question, then, is whether, Mr. Bucher's advice to give a statement 
was reasonable, in view of what Mr. Bucher knew, or should have known, at the time. 
At the time Mr. Bucher advised defendant, he knew that defendant had been arrested 
and charged with murder based on evidence that the police had already gathered. R259:6-8. 
Mr. Bucher also knew that at least one witness—Anthony Ferguson—could positively 
identify defendant as the killer. R259:10-12, 22, 29, 36. Ferguson knew defendant. 
R258:33; R259:18,36. Although Ferguson claimed that he did not see defendant with a gun, 
he told police that he saw defendant fighting with the victim at the time of the shooting. 
R259:12. Ferguson also told police that he drove defendant away from the scene of the 
murder. R259:12, 17-18,22. Because Ferguson knew defendant, there was no likelihood 
that Ferguson could be impeached regarding his identification of defendant. 
Defendant downplays this important evidence, emphasizing instead that Ferguson did 
not testify at trial, and that his counsel did not discover before he gave his statement that no 
other witness to the shooting could identify him. Br. Aplt. 19-20, 31, 36. Mr. Bucher, 
however, cannot be faulted for not foreseeing that Ferguson would defy a subpoena. 
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Moreover, while the other witnesses to the shooting could not directly identify defendant, 
their testimony, in conjunction with Ferguson's statement, made his identification a foregone 
conclusion. For example, Melissa Adams saw the shooter immediately get into what turned 
out to be Ferguson's teal Ford Explorer. R260:109, 119. And defendant's former little 
league football coach saw defendant near the site of the shooting just moments before it 
happened. R260:51-53. Thus, at the time Mr. Bucher advised defendant to give a statement, 
he knew that defendant could be positively identified. 
In addition to knowing that defendant could be positively identified, Mr. Bucher also 
knew, from talking with defendant, that he had a viable self-defense claim. R259:26-27. Mr. 
Bucher knew that the victim had a history of violence and had threatened defendant. Id. He 
also knew that it was the victim, not defendant, who initiated the confrontation that led to the 
shooting. Id. Finally, Mr. Bucher found defendant and his story to be credible. Id. 
And, contrary to defendant's claim, Mr. Bucher did investigate before advising him 
to give a statement. Mr. Bucher testified that before defendant gave the statement, Mr. 
Bucher talked extensively with defendant, talked with the detective, and reviewed some 
initial discovery he had received. R259:22, 25, 28. Defendant does not say what other 
evidence Mr. Bucher could have found after further investigation, other than to suggest that 
no witness could identify defendant as the shooter. Br. Aplt. 18-20. But, as explained, 
Ferguson and Adams together provided police with a conclusive identification, and Mr. 
Bucher knew at least that much when he advised defendant. The fact that no other witness 
alone could identify defendant as the shooter did not weaken the State's case. Again, 
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defendant points to no other evidence that Mr. Bucher would have discovered with further 
investigation that might have affected his advice.8 ' 
Under the foregoing circumstances, it was not unreasonable for Mr. Bucher to believe 
that defendant's best strategy was to advance a self-defense claim. As Mr. Bucher explained, 
he wanted to present defendant's self-defense claim "early on" because he "hoped to either 
try the thing under the idea that [defendant] was acting in self-defense," or he hoped for a 
plea bargain for something less than murder. R259:25. 
Defendant scoffs at Mr. Bucher's first proffered reason, contending that a defendant 
is "not required to announce his trial strategy beforehand" and that "[l]ittle tactical advantage 
lies in detailing the defense theory before discovery, months before trial." Br. Aplt. 24. 
While defendant is correct that he need not reveal his trial strategy beforehand, he is wrong 
that there is "little tactical advantage" in promptly detailing a viable self-defense claim. 
The "tactical advantage" of an early statement was that defendant could (and did) 
testify at trial in line with his statement, thereby showing the jury that he had nothing to hide 
and that he had been consistently cooperative, honest, and forthright. See, e.g., 
Knappenberger, 672 S.W.2d at 56 (counsel's strategy to have defendant make pre-trial 
throughout his argument, defendant asserts that Mr. Bucher's advice was based 
entirely on the detective's "misstatements about the existence of witnesses who could 
identify [defendant]. Br. Aplt. 18-20. First, it is clear from the suppression hearing, the 
preliminary hearing, and trial, that the detective did not misstate the strength of the State's 
case. &eR258:15-21, 30-33; R259:10-12, 17-18; R260:73-95, 107-22. Between 
Ferguson and Adams, the State could positively identify defendant as the shooter. 
Another witness—defendant's former little league football coach—also put defendant 
near the scene at the time of the shooting. Second, it is also clear from the suppression 
hearing that Mr. Bucher relied on this accurate information in advising his client. 
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statement of self-defense and testify at trial in line with that statement was reasonable 
because it showed jury that defendant had consistently been forthright and honest). Such a 
strategy, therefore, enhances the credibility of the claim for the jury. Indeed, defendant's trial 
counsel made sure that the jury knew that defendant had nothing to hide and that he had fully 
cooperated with police by turning himself in the day after the murder and "voluntarily]" 
giving a statement to police a mere "four or five days later." R261:202. See also 260:98-99, 
104. That the strategy ultimately did not succeed, does make it unreasonable.9 See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. 
Defendant also disparages Mr. Bucher' s secondary plan to use defendant' s statement 
to obtain a favorable plea bargain. Br. Aplt. 24-25. Defendant faults Mr. Bucher for 
advising him to give a statement without first conducting discovery or "discussing the 
possibility of leniency" with the prosecution. Id. Defendant asserts that Mr. Bucher 
effectively "handed the prosecution the most incriminating evidence in exchange for 
nothing." Br. Aplt. 25. 
Because Mr. Bucher's first proffered strategy was sound, it does not matter whether 
his second one was. In any event, advising defendant to make a statement to curry favor with 
the prosecution was reasonable under these circumstances. Contrary to defendant's claims, 
9Although not applicable here, another reason for adopting the strategy employed 
by Mr. Bucher is to make a record of the self-defense claim so that the defendant will not 
have to testify. See, e.g., Smith, 171 F.3d 569 at 573 (where defendant had low 
intelligence and criminal history, reasonable for counsel "to believe that the best way to 
get the provocation facts into evidence would be by having [defendant] make a statement 
to the police instead of testifying at trial."). 
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Mr. Bucher did investigate before advising him to make a statement. See R259:21-30. He 
also contacted the prosecutor, who told him to arrange the interview directly with Detective 
Parks. R259:8-9; Defense Ex. 1. In any event, defendant had nothing with which to bargain 
for leniency before giving his statement. Police had already conclusively identified 
defendant as the shooter. Defendant had no accomplice that he could turn State's evidence 
against and nothing in the record suggests that he had other valuable information to offer. 
It is thus conceivable that Mr. Bucher reasonably hoped that by immediately cooperating and 
candidly telling his story, defendant might be able to convince the prosecutor that he was not 
the aggressor and had a viable self-defense claim that could result in an acquittal. • 
If the prosecutor were so convinced, Mr. Bucher could also reasonably hope for an 
offer to let defendant plead to manslaughter. But even if the prosecutor offered nothing, 
defendant had nothing to lose because he had already decided to present a self-defense claim 
at trial. And, as stated, establishing that claim early on would enhance its credibility. Thus, 
under these circumstances, Mr. Bucher reasonably advised defendant to give a statement 
before seeking a plea bargain.10 
10Mr. Bucher added at the motion to suppress hearing that he also hoped that the 
statement would result in a reduction of bail for his client. R259:25. Defendant asserts 
that such a view was "inconceivable55 once he admitted his involvement, given that he 
was unemployed, unmarried, and facing murder charges. Br. Aplt. 25. Again, because 
Mr. Bucher had other legitimate strategic reasons for his advice, it does not matter 
whether this one was reasonable. But it should be remembered that this was not Mr. 
Bucher5s primary reason. Also, Mr. Bucher5 s idea may not have been as unreasonable as 
defendant suggests, particularly if defendant had convinced the prosecution that he had 
acted in self-defense. 
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In sum, Mr. Bucher had a legitimate strategy in advising defendant to give a statement 
early on, so as to facilitate a credible self-defense claim at trial. That the jury ultimately 
rejected defendant's self-defense claim does not render that strategy unreasonable. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. That other attorneys may have chosen a different strategy 
also does not render Mr. Bucher's performance unreasonable. Id. Indeed, given what Mr. 
Bucher knew at the time he gave his advice, and given the evidence actually presented at 
trial, it is clear that a self-defense claim was defendant's best chance for an acquittal or 
leniency. •. ;• >• v;- • ~;' i : • :' • ...v-' •( •'.-. •',: • :>. ' z." '.;o". • y A r ~ • • ;;,• •'•: - y ;,\.. •:. •?;<> •: 
2. The record does not support defendant's claim that his attorney usurped 
his right to decide the objectives of representation. 
Defendant argues that Mr. Bucher's performance surrounding his statement "usurped" 
defendant's right "to decide the objectives of representation." Br. Aplt. 14. Specifically, 
defendant claims that "Mr. Bucher effectively confessed [defendant] to manslaughter, having 
decided without consulting [defendant] that a claim of 'imperfect self-defense' was 
[defendant's] only plausible defense." Br. Aplt. 14. Defendant asserts that "[b]y so doing, 
Mr. Bucher violated the tenet universal to the American justice system that a lawyer 'shall 
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation.'" Br. Aplt. 14 
(quoting Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.2(a)). 
Although not clear, defendant's argument appears to be directed at Mr. Bucher' s pre-
interview statement to Detective Parks that "identity wasn't an issue" and that "the case had 
self-defense aspects of it that he wanted to come out." See Br. Aplt. 14-15. The claim also 
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appears to generally attack Mr. Bucher's advice to give a statement, because defendant also 
asserts, "There were no pressing deadlines requiring such hasty action. Mr. Bucher could 
certainly have consulted with [defendant] before telling the detective that [defendant] was 
involved, and then insisting that [defendant] give a statement." Br. Aplt. 16.
 + 
.Whichever statement defendant is attacking, his claim suffers from several mistaken 
assumptions. First, defendant erroneously asserts that Mr. Bucher unilaterally, without any 
input from him, decided to assert a self-defense or imperfect self-defense claim. As stated, 
however, the trial court expressly found that defendant's statement was "made as part of the 
cogent and joint strategy of [defendant] and his attorney to argue that Maestas had been 
killed in self-defense, or that at most [defendant] was guilty of manslaughter . . . ." Rl 17 
(emphasis added). 
Defendant argues that this finding is "clearly erroneous," but marshals no evidence 
in support. See Br. Aplt. 41-42. Failure to marshal is reason alone to reject this argument. 
See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain 
Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ffif 23-27, 553 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. 
In any event, the suppression hearing evidence amply supports the finding. Mr. 
Bucher testified that he had several conversations with defendant between October 22 to 
October 27. R259:28. Mr. Bucher explained that before the interview with Detective Parks, 
he had talked to defendant "about how to do the case," although he did not think defendant 
knew "[e]xactly what the statement was and when it was going to place." R259:24-25. Then, 
before defendant gave a statement, Mr. Bucher talked extensively with him, reviewing "the 
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evidence against him and possible consequences" and explaining why the best strategy would 
be a self-defense or imperfect self-defense claim. R259:25, 28. Defendant testified that 
although he initially did not want to give the statement, Mr. Bucher "persuaded" him to do 
so. R259:36-37. Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that an attorney should not 
try to persuade his client to choose the strategy that counsel, in his professional judgment, 
believes is best 
Second, defendant's argument erroneously assumes that Mr. Bucher's pre-interview 
statement to Detective Parks amounted to "confessing" him to manslaughter. It is not a 
"confession" for a defendant seen fighting with a homicide victim at the time and place of 
the homicide to tell police he shot in self-defense. It is, rather, a "justification." See Utah 
Code Ann. §76-2-401 (West2004). Moreover, Mr. Bucher's statement told Detective Parks 
nothing new. Thus, neither Mr. Bucher's pre-interview statements nor defendant's statement 
amounted to a "confession." 
Finally, defendant fails to explain why Mr. Bucher's statement matters, given that 
defendant himself subsequently detailed his involvement to police. Mr. Bucher's statement 
was not admitted at trial. If defendant is claiming that Mr. Bucher's statement forced him 
to give his statement, nothing in the record supports that claim. Nor does defendant cite any 
authority that Mr. Bucher's statement would have been admissible if defendant had not 
subsequently given his statement. 
In sum, defendant has not shown that Mr. Bucher acted unilaterally or without first 
consulting him. Indeed, the trial court's findings and the record show otherwise. 
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3. The record does not support the claim that Mr. Bucher violated his 
client's confidences. 
In a related argument, defendant asserts that Mr. Bucher's pre-interview statement 
violated his attorney-client privilege. Br. Aplt. 16-17. Again, defendant's argument rests on 
a mistaken assumption. First, defendant assumes that Mr. Bucher was unauthorized to make 
the statement. As explained, however, the trial court expressly found that defendant's 
statement was part of a joint strategy to set forth a self-defense claim. And, according to the 
record, Mr. Bucher communicated with defendant several times before the interview. 
Nothing in the record suggests that Mr. Bucher did not have authority to make this statement. 
Second, Mr. Bucher's general statement, that "identity wasn't an issue" and that 
defendant acted in self-defense was a realistic assessment of the evidence, not a breach of 
confidence. Both Mr. Bucher and Detective Parks already knew from sources other than 
defendant that identity was not an issue. 
Finally, defendant's detailed statement cured any harm that could have possibly 
flowed from a breach of confidence. While defendant speculates that Mr. Bucher could have 
been called as a prosecution witness, he cites no authority for that proposition. In any event, 
Mr. Bucher was not called as a witness and his statement was not used against defendant. 
4, The record does not support defendant's claim that Mr. Bucher did not 
ensure a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. 
Defendant finally claims that Mr. Bucher performed deficiently because he did not 
ensure that defendant validly waived his Miranda rights before giving his statement. 
Defendant essentially claims that Mr. Bucher should have insisted that Detective Parks read 
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his Miranda rights to him and that Mr. Bucher5s "purported waiver of [defendant's right to 
remain silent" was invalid. Br. Aplt. 20-23. This claim hinges on whether defendant's 
Miranda rights were violated. As explained below in Point II5 however, Miranda rights need 
not be administered where counsel is present throughout the statement and where defendant 
had an opportunity to consult with counsel before giving the statement. Mr. Bucher, 
therefore, could not have performed deficiently in this regard. 
D. Defendant has not shown that counsel's advice to talk to police prejudiced him. 
Because Mr. Bucher had a legitimate strategic reason for advising defendant to give 
a statement, this Court need not reach the prejudice prong. But if it does, defendant has not 
shown prejudice. • 
1. Because defendant has not shown an actual conflict of interest or 
constructive denial of counsel, prejudice may not be presumed. 
In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that prejudice may be presumed because Mr. 
Bucher had "an actual conflict of interest," or because defendant was "constructively denied 
assistance of counsel." Br. Aplt. 25-26. Defendant has shown neither. 
Conflict of interest. As defendant correctly points out, the Sixth Amendment right 
to the effective assistance of counsel includes the right to conflict-free counsel. Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). To show this right was violated, defendant must 
establish both that his counsel had an actual conflict and that the conflict adversely affected 
his counsel's performance. Id. at 348. See also United States v. Alvarez, 137 F.3d 1249, 
1252 (10th Cir. 1998); State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40^22,984 P3d 382; State v. Johnson,&23 
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P.2d 484,488 (Utah App. 1991). An actual conflict of interest exists "if counsel was forced 
to make choices advancing other interests to the detriment of his client." Alvarez, 137 F.3d 
at 1252. See also Lovell, 1999 UT 40,122. "To demonstrate an actual conflict of interest, 
the [defendant] must be able to point to specific instances in the record which suggest an 
impairment or compromise of his interests for the benefit of another party."' Alvarez, 137 
F.3d at 1252 (quoting Danner v. United States, 820 F.2d 1166, 1169 (11th Cir. 1987)). "If 
the defendant makes such a showing, prejudice need not be demonstrated to prevail on the 
claim." Johnson, 823 P.2d at 488 (citing Cuyler). Rather, prejudice will be presumed. Id.; 
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 345-50. , -
Defendant cites no specific instance where Mr. Bucher "was forced to make choices 
advancing other interests to the detriment of his client." Alvarez, 137 F.3d at 1252. 
Defendant's conflict of interest claim stems solely from his belief that counsel performed 
objectively unreasonably in advising him to give a statement to police so early in the 
proceedings. While defendant suggests that Mr. Bucher abandoned his duty of loyalty to him 
by advising him to give a statement, see Br. Aplt. 27-29, the record does not support that 
claim. As stated, Mr. Bucher talked extensively with defendant before he gave his statement 
and Mr. Bucher conducted preliminary discovery and investigation. More important, Mr. 
Bucher explained why he believed that self-defense was defendant's best claim. This was 
not a case, as defendant suggests, where counsel colluded with the prosecution to the 
detriment of his client. 
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In sum, defendant identifies no interest that was advanced over his own. Rather, he 
merely complains that Mr. Bucher advised him to give a statement before he had adequately 
investigated and without getting something "of value" in return. Br. Aplt. 30-31. In other 
words, defendant merely claims that his counsel made negligent choices. A negligent choice, 
without more, does not establish an actual conflict of interest for purposes of presuming 
prejudice.11.;- .:--•::.;;'... 
Constructive denial of counsel Defendant correctly states that he also need not prove 
prejudice where he has shown a "complete denial of counsel." Br. Aplt. 30. See United 
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). But defendant has not shown that he was 
completely denied counsel. 
A "complete denial of counsel" occurs where "counsel was either totally absent, or 
prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding," or where 
"counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." 
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 & n.25. It is the last category that defendant insists applies here. 
Br. Aplt. 30-32. 
Defendant has not shown that Mr. Bucher "entirely fail[ed] to subject the 
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing," or that his advice led to that result. Mr. 
Bucher was faced with two potential defenses: forcing the State to identify defendant or 
1
 defendant's conflict of interest claim continues to rely on the erroneous 
allegation that Mr. Bucher performed no investigation, did not consult with defendant, 
and had no legitimate basis for his advice. Br. Aplt. 30-32. As explained, Mr. Bucher 
conducted an adequate investigation, consulted with defendant, and had a reasonable 
strategy for advising defendant to give a statement to police. 
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forcing the State to prove that defendant did not act in self-defense. Mr. Bucher knew that 
the State had witnesses who could conclusively identify defendant. Thus, under the 
circumstances, it was reasonable for Mr. Bucher to advise self-defense. The reasonableness 
of his advice is supported by the information that his client had given him and the evidence 
of self-defense ultimately presented at trial. ; : 
In short, this was not a case in which Mr. Bucher encouraged his client to cooperate 
with no benefit. By having his client make the statement when he did, Mr. Bucher laid the 
foundation for defendant to present a credible self-defense claim at trial. Setting up a 
defense that could result in an acquittal or reduced charge is hardly an "entire[] fail[ure] to 
subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing."12 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. 
2. Defendant has not shown that "but for" counsel's advice, there was a 
reasonable probability of a better outcome for him. 
Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by Mr. Bucher's advice because the 
prosecution used his statement at trial against him, both to prove guilt and to undermine his 
12Defendant asserts that this Court may presume prejudice irrespective of whether 
there was a conflict of interest or denial of counsel as long as he can show that he 
received an unfair trial. Br. Aplt. 32-33. This argument is directly contrary to Strickland, 
Defendant essentially argues that his trial was unfair because his trial attorney was locked 
into a self-defense claim once the motion to suppress was denied and that the prosecution 
used his statement to prove guilt and to undermine the self-defense claim. That claim is 
nothing more than a claim that Mr. Bucher performed deficiently. Strickland held that 
aside from constructive denial of counsel or a conflict of interest, "actual ineffectiveness 
claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general requirement 
that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
Defendant, therefore, must prove prejudice. 
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self-defense claim.13 See Br. Aplt. 37. Defendant's argument, however, does not show the 
prejudice that Strickland requires. 
As explained, the prejudice standard under Strickland can be met "only by showing 
there is a reasonable probability that 'butfor counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would be different.'" State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d461, 465 (Utah App. 1993) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (emphasis added). In other words, defendant must 
demonstrate that if counsel had not made the alleged error, there is a reasonable probability 
that he would have been acquitted or convicted of the lesser offense of manslaughter. 
Defendant has not shown, nor can he, that this is the case. 
To show prejudice here, defendant must first show that if he had not given the 
statement, as advised by Mr. Bucher, his trial counsel would not have run the self-defense 
claim at trial, but would have instead run a claim that he was not the person—or at least 
could not be identified as the person—who shot Maestas. If trial counsel would have 
claimed self-defense anyway, defendant could not have been prejudiced by Mr. Bucher's 
advice. Defendant must also show, however, that if his counsel had presented an identity 
defense, there was a reasonable likelihood that it would have resulted in an acquittal. 
Defendant has not made either showing. 
13Defendant also argues that Mr. Bucher's inadequate investigation before advising 
him prejudiced him. Br. Aplt. 38-39. This argument, however, ultimately goes to 
whether Mr. Bucher's advice to make a statement was prejudicial. Presumably, under 
defendant's argument, if Mr. Bucher had adequately investigated, he would not have 
advised him to make a statement. Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether Mr. Bucher's 
advice to give a statement was prejudicial under Strickland. 
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First, defendant has not shown that but for his statement, his trial counsel would not 
have presented a self-defense claim. While it is true that trial counsel moved to suppress the 
statement, that alone does not prove that he ultimately would have chosen an identity defense 
over self-defense. The record in this case, including the strong self-defense case actually 
presented at trial, suggests that trial counsel likely would have stuck with self-defense. This 
was not a case in which defendant had a believable identity defense. The State had 
eyewitnesses, including Anthony Ferguson, Melissa Adams, and defendant's little league 
football coach, who could conclusively place defendant in a fight with the victim at the time 
of the shooting. Moreover, as defendant proved at trial, he and the victim were involved in 
a long-standing feud. The State could have used this evidence to prove identity by showing 
that defendant had a motive to kill Maestas. And, as defendant points out, he told his mother 
and girlfriend immediately after the shooting what had happened. Br. Aplt. 36, n.4; 
R260:141 -42,161. While defendant claims this evidence would not have come in but for his 
statement, it is more than likely that police would have discovered these statements if 
defendant had insisted on putting the State to its proof of identity. 
In short, with or without defendant's statement to police, trial counsel was faced with 
the stark reality that defendant had shot and killed Maestas. Defendant admitted this to his 
mother, his girlfriend, the police, the jury, and the sentencing court. Trial counsel, like Mr. 
Bucher, was also faced with the reality that there were witnesses who could place defendant 
at the scene. But trial counsel also knew that defendant had a history with Maestas that gave 
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him a credible self-defense claim. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that an 
experienced criminal attorney would choose identity over self-defense. _ 
But even if trial counsel would have chosen identity, defendant has not shown thatthat 
defense was more likely to result in a better outcome than the self-defense claim he ran. 
Defendant's argument to the contrary relies on the fact that the witnesses to the shooting 
could not identity him at trial and that Ferguson did not appear at trial, although subpoenaed. 
Br. Aplt. 36. Defendant ignores, however, that if the prosecution had known that it was 
required to prove an identity defense, it would have made certain that Ferguson appeared. 
The prosecution certainly could have obtained a short continuance while it compelled 
Ferguson's appearance. And, if defendant had not made his self-defense statement to police, 
it is likely that police would have continued to develop leads bolstering their case. 
In sum, defendant has not shown that Mr. Bucher's advice prejudiced him.14 
Defendant asserts that "even [though] trial counsel [ultimately] pursued a self-
defense claim at trial, absent the detective's testimony from [defendant's] statement, there 
still exists a reasonable probability that the self-defense or manslaughter strategies would 
have succeeded." Br. Aplt. 39. He does not explain, however, why this would be so. 
Defendant's trial testimony was largely consistent with his statement to police. 
Defendant was not significantly impeached regarding any inconsistencies. While 
defendant complains that the prosecution expressed disbelief during closing arguments at 
his claim of self-defense, that incredulity was based almost entirely on defendant's story 
at trial, not on any significant inconsistencies between his statement and trial testimony. 
SeeR26l:250-56. 
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\ POINT II 
MIRANDA WARNINGS ARE NOT REQUIRED WHERE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL INITIATED THE INTERVIEW WITH POLICE, 
DEFENDANT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH 
COUNSEL, AND COUNSEL WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE 
;'•:•;. INTERVIEW 
Defendant contends that the trial court should have suppressed his statement to police 
because he did not voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently waive his Miranda rights. Br. 
Aplt. 40-48. Defendant argues that the detective was required to read all four Miranda 
warnings to him and that the "mere presence of defense counsel [did] not cure" that failure. 
Id. at 40, 44-48. Defendant acknowledges that Mr. Bucher advised him "of his right to 
remain silent," but claims that nothing in the record shows that defendant was advised that 
anything he said could be used against him. Id. at 44, 47. This, according to defendant, 
resulted in only partial compliance with Miranda. See id. at 44-45. Defendant also argues 
that Mr. Bucher could not waive his right to remain silent for him. Id. at 44-48. Defendant 
finally asserts that the "failure to secure a valid waiver of Miranda rights" from him was not 
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 49. 
As explained below, the presence of counsel obviates the need for Miranda warnings. 
Even assuming a Miranda violation, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the 
police did not need defendant's statement to prove that he shot Maestas and because 
defendant used his statement to advance his self-defense claim at trial. Consequently, the 
trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements. 
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A. Miranda warnings are unnecessary when counsel is present during the interview. 
The United States Supreme Court declared in Miranda that "the prosecution may not 
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation 
of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure 
the privilege against self incrimination " Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) 
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court held that "unless other fully effective means are 
devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous 
opportunity to exercise it," police are required, before questioning, to warn the suspect "that 
he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence 
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed." Id. at 444. 
In adopting these procedural safeguards, the Miranda court sought to ameliorate the 
coercive effects of custodial interrogation. Id. at 445. In particular, the Supreme Court 
emphasized the coercive nature of isolating the suspect during interrogation. See id. at 445-
58, 461. For example, the Miranda court noted that in each of the four cases before it, "the 
defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room 
in which he was cut off from the outside world." Id. at 445 (emphasis added). Thus, all four 
cases "share[d] salient features - incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-
dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of 
constitutional rights." Id. (emphasis added). The Court then cited extensively to police 
manuals instructing interrogators that "'the principal psychological factor contributing to a 
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successful interrogation is privacy - being alone with the person under interrogation/" Id. 
at 449 (citation omitted). v : * 
It was the concern with the coercive effects of isolation that led the Supreme Court 
to observe that counsel's presence during the interrogation would, by itself, provide a 
sufficient alternative procedural safeguard to secure the privilege against self-incrimination: 
The presence of counsel, in all the cases before us today, would be the 
adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police 
interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege. His presence would 
insure that the statements made in the government-established atmosphere are 
not the product of compulsion. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466 (emphasis added). In other words, "the presence of counsel dispels 
that compelling atmosphere of custodial interrogation to the point of obviating the need for 
the familiar Miranda warnings." People v. Watts, 2006 WL 2271304, at *4 (Mich. App. 
August 8,2006) (unpublished decision) (attached in Addendum C). See also Smith v. State, 
832 So.2d 92,98 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) {Miranda court's "concerns about 'incommunicado 
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere'" not implicated where 
counsel present).
 ; . -.'•<-' 
Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has addressed whether the presence 
of counsel obviates the need for Miranda warnings. Several federal and other state courts, 
however, have relied on the foregoing language in Miranda to hold that counsel's presence 
during the interrogation makes Miranda warnings unnecessary. See, e.g., United States v. 
Facone, 544 F.2d 607, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1976) (rejecting "as frivolous," the claim that FBI 
agent could not testify regarding defendant's statement, made in his attorney's presence, 
• • 3 8 
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without first informing defendant and his counsel that the statement could be used at trial); 
Frohmann v. United States, 380 F.2d 832, 836 (8th Cir. 1967) (defendant could not show 
Miranda violation where counsel was present when he made statement); United States v. 
Thevis, 469 F. Supp. 490, 507-08 (D. Conn. 1979) (statement made in presence of 
defendant's two attorneys admissible even though no Miranda warnings given); United 
States v. Guariglia,151 F. Supp. 259,264 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) {Miranda warnings unnecessary 
when counsel is present); Smith v. State, 832 So.2d 92,98 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (state need 
not show defendant advised of Miranda rights because counsel present during interrogation 
and defendant had opportunity to consult with counsel before interrogation); People v. 
Mounts, 784 P.2d 792,795-96 (Colo. 1990) {Miranda warnings rendered superfluous where 
"defendant and his chosen defense counsel are given adequate time for consultation prior to 
any police interrogation, and counsel is actually present at the police interview"); Collins v. 
State, 420 A.2d 170, 176-77 (Del. 1980) {Miranda warnings "rendered unnecessary and 
superfluous where counsel for defendant is present and defendant has been given an adequate 
opportunity to consult with counsel prior to the giving of any statement"); Baxter v. State, 
331 S.E.2d 561,568 (Ga. 1985) {Miranda warnings unnecessary because counsel's presence 
during interrogation provided adequate protective device), overruled on other grounds by 
Height v. State, 604 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. 2004); State v. Randall, 557 P.2d 1386, 1390-91 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1976) {Miranda warnings unnecessary before parole revocation hearing where 
counsel was present); State v. McKinney, 603 S.W.2d 755, 760 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) 
(noting "Miranda case itself holds that the presence of the defendant's attorney obliterates 
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the necessity for a police officer to advise one in custody of his rights as mandated by 
Miranda"); State v. Alexandre, 2003 WL 21387159, at *3 (Me. Super. May 11, 2003) 
(unpublished decision) (police did not need to advise defendant of his Miranda rights 
because counsel was actually present) (attached in Addendum C); People v. Watts, 2006 WL 
2271304, at *4 (Mich. App. August 8, 2006) (unpublished decision) (noting that ''Miranda 
Court recognized that the presence of counsel dispels the compelling atmosphere of custodial 
interrogation to the point of obviating the need for the familiar Miranda warnings") (attached 
as Addendum C). See also Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King, Criminal 
Procedure, § 6.8(a), at p. 573 (2d ed. 1999) ("It is generally accepted that if the attorney was 
actually present during the interrogation, then this obviates the need for the [Miranda] 
warnings.").- ' ••••:'••••)\~:1 '•""•:'••'•::. -
Defendant cites only two cases to the contrary: State v. DeWeese, 582 S.E.2d 786, 
795 (W.Va. 2003), and State v. Joseph, 128 P.3d 795, 810-11 (Haw.), reh 'g denied 128 P.3d 
891 (Haw. 2006). Br. Aplt. 46-48. Those cases are inapposite, but to the extent they are not, 
they are against Miranda and the clear weight of the authority cited above. 
The issue in De Weese was whether the defendant's statements during a polygraph test 
were admissible in the absence of Miranda warnings. DeWeese, 582 S.E.2d at 794. The 
police had not administered Miranda warnings before the test because DeWeese's attorney, 
who was in the building before and during the test, told police that the warnings were 
unnecessary. Id. at 795-96. DeWeese's attorney, however, was not permitted in the room 
while the polygraph was administered. Tii. at795 n.17. •: 
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The State in DeWeese argued that the "failure to provide Miranda warnings was not 
fatal because Mr. DeWeese's counsel was present in the building when the tests were 
administered, defense counsel expressly waived the right to have Miranda warnings given, 
and Miranda warnings had previously been given to Mr. DeWeese by the police." Id. at 795. 
The West Virginia Supreme Court rejected that argument, stating that "[ujnder Miranda, the 
mere presence of defense counsel at an interrogation does not negate the necessity for 
providing the warning against self-incrimination." Id. The De Weese court further stated that 
it had "found no decision wherein a court has ruled that a defendant forfeits his/her right to 
be informed of the privilege against self-incrimination merely because he/she has exercised 
the right to have counsel present at an interrogation." Id. 
The De Weese court's statements were essentially dicta because they were unnecessary 
to the holding. DeWeese5s attorney was not present during the interrogation, but was 
elsewhere in the building. In any event, DeWeese's statements are clearly wrong in the face 
of Miranda and the authorities cited above. As explained, Miranda expressly states that the 
"presence of counsel, in all the cases before us today, would be the adequate protective 
device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the 
privilege." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466. DeWeese does not even acknowledge this 
pronouncement. See DeWeese, 582 S.E.2d at 795-97. And while the DeWeese court was 
unable to find a single case holding that counsel's presence obviates the need for Miranda 
warnings, the State has cited to twelve that have. DeWeese, therefore, is unpersuasive. 
41 '. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Joseph is equally unpersuasive. In that case, the Hawaii Supreme Court held 
that Miranda warnings must be given even where defendant's counsel set up the interview 
and was present throughout the interrogation. Joseph, 128 P.3d at 809. But the Joseph court 
based its decision entirely on the Hawaii state constitution "and not on the interpretation of 
the United States Constitution by the United States Supreme Court." Id. at 806, 809-11. 
Moreover, the Joseph court relied heavily on the flawed DeWeese in reaching its holding. 
Id. at 809-11. Like DeWeese, Joseph does not acknowledge Miranda's pronouncement that 
counsel's presence alone is "an adequate protective device." Nor does Joseph acknowledge 
any of the many cases cited above. * 
In sum, Miranda and a overwhelming majority of courts addressing the issue hold that 
counsel's presence is "an adequate protective device" that obviates the need for Miranda 
warnings. Here, defendant's counsel initiated the interview with police, consulted 
extensively with defendant before the interview, and was present throughout the interview. 
The trial court, therefore, properly denied defendant's motion to suppress.15 
B. Even assuming a Miranda violation, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Even if there were a Miranda violation, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
because defendant used the statement to his benefit at trial and because the State did not need 
15The warnings given in this case were adequate, in any event. Because defendant 
exercised his right to counsel by having counsel present, he did not need to be warned of 
that right. Counsel advised defendant of the right to remain silent immediately before the 
interview began and stated, in defendant's presence, that defendant wished to waive that 
right.. See 259:15-16. Defendant could have corrected that statement, but did not. 
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it to prove defendant shot and killed Maestas. See State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440,444 (Utah 
1986) (harmlessness of Miranda violation must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt). 
Defendant asserts that any Miranda violation was harmful beyond a reasonable doubt 
because it proved his guilt, locked him into a self-defense claim, and "deprived him of the 
right to confront adverse witnesses with their inability to link him to the scene." Br. Aplt. 
49. This argument presupposes that but for a Miranda violation and his statement, he would 
not have presented a self-defense claim, but would have instead challenged the reliability of 
the eyewitnesses. But, as explained above, it is unlikely under all the circumstances of this 
case that his counsel would not have run a self-defense claim. Consequently, admission of 
his prior statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, trial counsel used 
defendant's prior statement to show consistency in his story and that defendant had always 
been cooperative and honest with police. See, e.g., R260:98-104; R260:130-31; R261:202. 
As a result, defendant's self-defense claim was bolstered by his prior statement. 
But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that trial counsel would have run the 
identity defense instead, the absence of his prior statement would not have altered the 
outcome. The State had witnesses who could positively identify defendant as the shooter, 
even before he made his statement. Thus, the State did not need defendant's statement to 
prove that he shot and killed Maestas. Any violation of Miranda, therefore, was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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v . CONCLUSION 
B ased on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant' s 
conviction. • . • 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J54* day of AUOUAJ- 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
'a^k. 
LURA B. DUFAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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ADDENDUM A 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const, amend. V 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 
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Amendment V. Grand jury indictment for capital crimes; double jeopardy; 
self-incrimination; due process of law; just compensation for property 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE Si W.\C^ '•'} \-
FINDING O F FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS O F L A W 
J<K v> aidant's Motion to Suppress 
Statements) 
e l ] ( » • 3419069;:^ 
Defendant. 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
: \ ' fcn . : r ' : • • • - . , ; . --[.I: ;.. * , inc hctore (lit ' * '"^-.-J ': 
14, 2005. Defendant Isaiah Vos was present, and was represented by counsel, Stephen R. 
IV leCaughey. The Mate was represented P> . ;LJ\.;* SC[\ Lalw C^.ii.v District Attorneys B. Fred' 
Burmester and Clark A. Harms. The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, District Court Judge, 
presided. The Court heard testimony, received evidence, heard the arguments of counsel, The 
Coiii I: thereafter took the mattei i :i rider advisement, and ISSII ed it's Minute Entry r uling on I\ lai cli 
22,2005. . 
Based upon the evidence and testimony adduced at the March 14, 2005 evidentiary 
hearing, and based upon good cause, the Court now makes and enters the following Findings of 
F a c t : ' • :• . . " ' • • ' : . . • ' •• • • ' . , . . . . . . • • • • • ' . . . * ' • • ' ' 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CaseNo. 041906923 ..'• 
P a g e 2 ..... •.••,; , • ; . - ~ ' . • • • . • ' , • \
-
; : ' , 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 21, 2004, Jeffrey Maestas ("Maestas") was shot four times while he 
was involved in an altercation or confrontation of some sort with another person at 
approximately 1832 West 700 North, in Salt Lake City, Utah. Maestas eventually died from 
these injuries. •••'; 
2. During the investigation following Maestas5 death, suspicion quickly turned to 
Isaiah Bo'Cage Vos ("Vos") as a possible suspect in the shooting death of Maestas. Within a 
few hours, Salt Lake City Police Department officers began looking for Vos, and letting it be 
known among Vos' associates that he was being sought for questioning in Maestas' death. 
3. On October 22, 2004, Detective Cordon Parks of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department Homicide Squad received a telephone call from John Bucher who identified himself 
as Isaiah Vos' lawyer, and sought to arrange the surrender of Vos to the police. 
4. ; .- Late in the evening of October 22, 2004, Vos surrendered to police at the law 
offices of John Bucher. By that time, police had developed probable cause to arrest Vos for the 
shooting death of Maestas. Vos was booked into the Salt Lake CountyAdult Detention Center at 
7:40 p.m. that evening. 
5. . A t the time of his arrest on October 22, 2004, Vos was given his Miranda 
warnings, and invoked his right to an attorney. No questioning of Vos was thereafter attempted 
by police officers. 
. 6. Following Vos' arrest, John Bucher subsequently arranged for Vos to make a 
statement to the police. Bucher testified that it was his intent was to establish what he perceived 
as his client's best defense, based on the evidence available to him at the time, of self-defense or 
imperfect self-defense. Bucher further testified that his strategy was then to seek a favorable plea 
bargain from the State by urging his client's cooperation. 
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-.•;• ' .'7, ;". On October 2(\ 2004, Vos was interviewed while in custody at the Salt Lake 
County s dult Deteriti* m c.e.t it< -I , In addition to ^ ? os and Detective Parks, Vc s5 attorney J olin 
Bucher, was presem \ V wi :i view was tape recorded by Detective Parks. ; u 
8. As the interv icu ^ommenced, Miranda warnings were waived by Mr. Bucher, and 
hw .•nu:..ed ; i- -. . . . ._ : . ; ;:,. durat ion a n a ..•;ai;;y >; .. .o i i i i v n ^ - * , ^ ; c L i i \ e 
P a r k s . :•••'•;•••• •.;;..;. - ^ r - .•-/.-^. :•..:•: :*• .'': 
.. '.. K V o s w a s advised by his attorney, J olin Boi iche i , that he ought to w- a i\ e his right to 
remain silent and give a statement to Detective Parks." ••-•:•' 
10. \ '(Kilxr 26, 2004 statements to Detective Parks were made knowingly, 
voluntarily, •. . > ne) • . . ; 
• 11 \ rk-hcr 2*\ iui>4 statements io Detective Turks were made as part of the 
cogent and joint strategy of Vos and his attorney ^ r-uc -!at V K -/ :. ' -4 K^ ; ';;\ . '-
defense, or that at most, Vos was guilty of manslaughter, arising Jrcui an imperfect u>e of deadly 
force in circumstances not amounting to reasonable self-defense. 
^ .. • ;•. 12. l presence c f \ os"" -attoi lie) during the Octot er 26, 2004 interview \ villi 
Detective Parks was an adequate protective device, and made the process of police interrogation 
conform to the dictates of Vos' constitutional privileges. 
:..'•'•' H ie pti 'scnct." nil "Vui'S" n U o i n e y d u r i n g the O c t o b e r 2(>, J 0 0 4 interv iew, w i t h 
Detective Parks insured that Vos' statements were not the product of compulsion. 
14. •> October 26, 200- ' ' ^ ;:- ^ :\\ \\\> ti ; - l\ . V. :r.' . :• • . t 
\ ' o s t o m e e t -v.:.;. c u x ! , v e P a r k s ,.; : ^ .^;. i
 t . h . L *\ i : i ty '< -u:. d e t e n t i o n Center , v!r J u c h c r 
specifically insured that Vos' Miranda rights were waived, and gave Vos the opportunity to 
fha i i i j e (us m i n d iilmiit d i s c u s s i n g flu/ uast: Willi I > d e d i v e P i n t s . ••'- •,-. :.-•' \ : •.: V . " . ' « ' . • 
• 15, • At the beginning of the interview, Mr. Bucher explained his strategy for the case, 
relating to advantages of "telling the whole story" given that it is a "gang case", and the defense 
t 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 041906923 , 
Page4 •' 
put forth by both Vos and his attorney was seld-defense, or at worst, imperfect self-defense 
manslaughter. '."••< r••;.'-:\ '.?'" ". -.-• "^-.V1-'" \ ^ v 
16* Mr. Bucher also told Vos, in the presence of Detective Parks, that his usual advice 
to criminal defendants is to "not talk to anybody about anything" but that the circumstances of 
this case are different. v ^ 
17. Mr. Bucher asked Vos to waive his right to remain silent and talk to Detective 
Parks. . 
' 18. Mr. Bucher spoke with Vos alone, before the interview recommenced, afterwhich 
Vos agreed to proceed with the interview. 
19. . The strategy of both Vos and Mr. Bucher in speaking with Detective Parks was to 
try and convince Detective Parks, and through him the prosecution, that either Vos actions in 
shooting Maestas were justified, or at worst, imperfect self-defense manslaughter. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1.' In the instant case it is clear that no Miranda violation nor coercion occurred, 
because Vos5 counsel was present when Vos voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and then 
made statements to Detective Parks. Vos' attorney initiated contact with Detective Parks, both to 
arrange for Vos to turn himself in to the police, and later to meet with Detective Parks at the jail 
to discuss this case, . v> - ••••"••• : ' ' -*'* ' 
• 2. Although Vos' statement was made while in custody, it was clearly made 
knowingly, voluntarily, and in the presence of counsel. 
3. Vos has not presented any argument to show that his prior counsel's (Mr, 
Bucher's) performance was objectively deficient. 
i * A 
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Utah courts place the burden of proving an ineffective assistance of counsel claim .', 
on the defendant, requiring h iiii to prove there wa s a "lack of a ri) conceivable tactical basis for • ' 
counsel's actions"' Suae v Mecharn, 2000 UT 247, TJ22, v P.5,1 '7 7 (quoting State v. Garrett, 
849P.2d578, S^ri'tahCtApp. 1993). 'V"- ' •'•'"•/. ' • : • '"' 
'.'
:
 /• J t Jtah, coiii I: of appeals has based its vie w on the U .S. Supreme Court's .• 
view in Strickland, holding that there is a "strong presumption that counsers conduct falls within 
"the wide range of reasonable professional assistance defendant mi :i st overcome the presi imption -. 
that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy," Id.' ' 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 TI S 668,689(1984)). 
• • • . ; • • : - . ' : - • ' : . . • ; . . . ; i . - i • - .
 t 
tactical and rational basis for his actions in advising Vos. 
• / ^irthc\ \ • Ucuj nut presented any argument t- ':-> to overcome the strong 
presumption ir: i, ; ..„'unse counsel's conduct falling within ;,., \ ;de range of reasonable 
professional assistance.." 
denied. 
DATED this <CK day of April, 200 
BYT 
\ \ a 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDING OF FACTS 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (Re: Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements) was 
deliyered to STEPHEN R. MCCAUGHEY, Attorney for the Defendant, at 10 West Broadway, 
Ste. 650, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on the U^-day of April, 2005. 
\^*C\ 
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unly the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Michigan. 
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v . . ' . ' • ' ' • ' • • • ' " • " . 
Coral Eugene WATTS, Defendant-Appellant. 
Docket No. 259903. 
A,a \ 2006. 
ir .' : I ./Lilt I D l . ' ' ' ! C . 
Before: KELLY. P.J , and MARKEY and METER, 
JJ. 
rUNPUBLISHED] ' \ ..-.. 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 Defendant appeals by right his conviction of 
first-degree premeditated murder in the December 
1, 1979 death of Helen Dutcher. MCL 750.316(l)(a) 
. The prosecution presented the testimony of one 
eyewitness, Joseph Foy, who identified defendant as 
the person who killed Dutcher by stabbing her 
multiple times. The trial court also ruled the 
prosecution could present evidence under MRE 
404(b) that defendant attacked 17 other women as 
evidence of defendant's motive (animus toward 
women), intent (premeditation and deliberation), 
and scheme, plan, or system in committing murder. 
We affirm. 
I F acto a 1 and Pro c e di ir al B ackground ' : 
The other acts evidence consisted of defendant's 
admitting to 12 murders of young women in the 
state of Texas between September 1991 and May 
1982, and one murder of a woman on October 31, 
1979 in Wayne County, Michigan. In addition, the 
prosecution presented evidence through the 
testimony of three survivors and defendant's 
admissions to Texas police officers that defendant 
attempted during 1982 to murder four other young 
women in Texas. The last attempted murder 
occurred on May 23, 1982 in Harris County, Texas. 
Defendant was arrested as a result of that attack, 
and on August 10, 1982, pleaded guilty to burglary 
of a habitation pursuant to a plea bargain with 
Harris County prosecutors that included a sentence 
recommendation of sixty years.FN1 The 
prosecution also promised immunity from 
prosecution in return for defendant confessing to the 
Texas murders. Harris County assistant district 
attorney Ira Jones and one of defendant's attorneys, 
Zinetta Burney, stated the terms of the immunity 
agreement during the August 10, 1982 Texas plea 
proceeding: 
FN1. Defendant was sentenced to 60 years 
imprisonment but appeals and subsequent 
changes in Texas law advanced his release 
date from his Texas sentence to May 6, 
2006. 
MR JONES: Your Honor, the plea bargaining 
between the Defendant and the State is that the 
State has agreed to recommend 60 years in the 
Texas Department of Corrections for offense which 
the Defendant has plead to and in exchange for that 
the Defendant has agreed he will lead the State of 
Texas, being the Houston homicide detectives, to 
all of the graves of individuals that he knows of 
here in Houston, Texas. He will also assist the 
Houston Police in their investigation in resolution 
of a number of unsolved murders in Houston. 
Likewise, he has agreed he will lead the police to 
graves and assist in clearing the offenses in the 
cities of Austin, Galveston, Texas and the cities of 
Ann Arbor, Michigan; Kalamazoo, Michigan; 
Detroit, Michigan, and Windsor, Ontario, Canada. 
MS BURNEY: One other thing further I think 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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should be in the record that as a result of his 
assistance, if any of the bodies are turned up or 
further charges, there will be no prosecution. 
MR. JONES: It is our agreement, with the Defense, 
the Defendant will not he prosecuted as to the 
results or his divulging location of his bodies or 
cooperation with the police authorities in those 
named cities so long as the named cites bind 
themselves in writing to nonprosecution and it is 
agreed between us he will not be prosecuted in 
Houston or Harris County for his information in the 
discovery of these bodies or the resolution of these 
murders and will not be so long as these other 
governmental entities bind themselves in writing to 
nonprosecution, otherwise, the Defendant will not 
cooperate with them prior to their binding 
themselves. [Plea Tr, August 10, 1982, pp 5-7.] 
*2 Beginning the same day as his plea, and over the 
next few days, defendant confessed to the Texas 
murders. On August 13, 1982, then Wayne County 
prosecuting attorney William C. Cahalan wrote to 
the Harris County district attorney's office and 
offered immunity to defendant in return for his 
statement regarding the October 31, 1979 murder in 
the City of Grosse Pointe Farms, Michigan, of 
Jeanne Clyne. On August 19, 1982, Detective Earl 
Field of the Grosse Pointe Farms police department 
interviewed defendant, who confessed to the Clyne 
murder. 
Before trial, the prosecution brought a motion in 
limine seeking an order allowing admission of the 
other acts evidence. MRE 404(b)(2). The motion 
detailed the proposed other acts evidence, asserted 
that the use of defendant's admissions was not 
prohibited by the nonprosecution agreements, and 
that the other acts were admissible for proper 
purposes subject to a limiting instruction. Defendant 
also filed a motion in limine, requesting that in the 
event the trial court granted the prosecution's 
motion, the court preclude evidence of the 
circumstances of defendant's admissions, i.e., that 
he was granted immunity. 
The trial court issued its written opinion and order 
on October 8, 2004, agreeing with the prosecution 
that the other acts evidence was not barred by the 
nonprosecution agreements. Further, the trial court 
reasoned that the prosecution's stated purposes in 
seeking to admit the other acts evidence-to prove 
motive, intent, and scheme, plan, or system-were 
proper and specifically permitted by MRE 404(b). 
The court found, "that the other acts evidence does 
tend to establish that Defendant hated women and is 
relevant to prove Defendant's motive for allegedly 
attacking Dutcher." Although noting that only one 
proper purpose is necessary to admit other acts, the 
trial court also agreed with the prosecution that the 
other acts evidence was relevant "to show that 
Defendant acted with premeditation and 
deliberation, and that he planned to kill his victims 
from the time he identified them." With respect to 
using the other acts to show defendant's scheme, 
plan, or system, the trial court rejected defendant's 
argument that the other acts were not sufficiently 
similar to the charged offense to be admissible. To 
complete its analysis, the trial court ruled that the 
other acts evidence should not be excluded on the 
basis of the danger of unfair prejudice. The court 
reasoned the evidence was not marginally probative 
but rather "compellingly powerful evidence" of 
motive. Accordingly, the trial court ruled the danger 
of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh its 
probative value. The trial court further ruled it 
would instruct the jury to limit the use of the 
evidence to its proper purposes. 
The trial court also granted defendant's motion in 
limine, ruling that the prosecution would not be 
permitted to show the circumstances of defendant's 
statements unless defendant sought to impeach the 
evidence. But, the court ruled it would permit the 
prosecution to elicit from witnesses testifying about 
defendant's statements that defendant was not asked 
about committing any crimes in Oakland County. 
*3 A jury trial was conducted between November 8, 
2004 and November 17, 2004. After the jury began 
its deliberations, the foreperson sent a note to the 
trial court that one of the jurors "casually mentioned 
that he visited the crime scene." The trial court and 
the parties all agreed to remove the juror from the 
jury and replace him with the alternate juror who 
had been sequestered with a deputy sheriff. The trial 
court denied defendant's motion for mistrial on the 
basis that the excused juror might have tainted other 
© 2006 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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members of the jury, ruling it had no information 
the excused juror had said anything to taint the jury. 
The jury returned its verdict of guilty of first-degree 
premeditated muuL Defendant imv. appeals by 
right. 
A. Standard of Review 
We review the admission or exclusion of evidence 
by the trial court for a clear abuse of discretion. 
People v. Starr, 457 Mich. 490, 494; 577 NW2d 
673 (1998). A trial court abuses its discretion when 
its decision is so palpably and grossly contrary to 
fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of 
will but the perversity of will, not the exercise of 
judgment but its defiance. People v. Hine, 467 
Mich. 242, 250; 650 NW2d 659 (2002). A trial 
court's decision on a close evidentiary question 
ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion. Id. Even 
if preserved, nonconstitutional evidentiary error will 
not merit reversal unless, after an examination of 
the entire cause, it affirmatively appears that it is 
more probable than not that the error was outcome 
determinative. People v. Lukity, 460 Mich. 484, 
495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Questions of law 
affecting the admissibility of evidence are reviewed 
de novo. Id. at 488. 
An unpreserved claim of evidentiary error is 
reviewed for plain error. MRE 103(d); People v. 
Cannes, 460 Mich. 750, 763; 597 NW 2d 130 
(1999). To obtain relief a defendant must persuade 
the Court that an error occurred, which was plain, 
clear or obviouis, and which affected the defendant's 
substantial rights because it affected the outcome of 
the proceedings. Id. Reversal is warranted only 
when plain error results in the conviction of an 
innocent person or seriously affected the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings, independent of guilt or innocence. Id.; 
People v. Knox, 469 Mich. 502, 508; 674 NW2d 
366 (2004). 
B. Miranda 
©2006 Jliujiisoii/VVVsl No CI 
Defendant first argues that the other acts evidence 
introduced through statements he made to the police 
should have been suppressed as the product of 
custodial interrogation without defendant having 
been advised of and waiving his rights as 
enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
467-479; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 
Because defendant did not object on this basis in 
the trial court it has not been preserved. People v. 
Aldrich, 246 Mich.App 101, 113; 631 NW2d 67 
(2001). We conclude that plain error warranting 
reversal has not occurred. 
*4 The Fifth Amendment precludes a person from 
being compelled to be a witness against himself in a 
criminal trial. US Const, Am V. To ensure the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment right to be free 
from compelled self-incrimination during the 
inherently coercive environment of custodial 
interrogation, the United States Supreme Court 
articulated the rule that the police must advise a 
suspect in custody that he has the right to remain 
silent, that anything he says may be used against 
him in a court of law, that he has a right to the 
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford 
an attorney, one will be appointed for him before 
any questioning. Miranda, supra at 467-479; 
People v. Daoud, 462 Mich. 621, 632-633; 614 
NW2d 152 (2000). "Custodial interrogation" is " 
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 
after a person has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way." Miranda, supra at 444. Generally, 
statements of an accused made during custodial 
interrogation are inadmissible unless the accused 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives his 
so-called Miranda rights. Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428, 435; 120 S Ct 2326; 147 
L.Ed.2d 405 (2000); People v. Harris, 261 
Mich.App 44, 55; 680 NW2d 17 (2004). 
The Miranda warnings are designed to protect: a 
suspect's Fifth Amendment right against compelled 
self-incrimination from being eroded by the 
inherently coercive environment of custodial 
interrogation. "The principal rationale of the 
requirement that Miranda warnings be given is to 
guard against the possibility that government agents 
might compel an individual to make 
aim to Oiig, U S (invt Works. • 
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self-incriminating statements while in custody." 
People v. Honeyman, 215 Mich.App 687; 694; 546 
NW2d 719 (1996). Thus, when there is no nexus 
between the reason the person is in custody and the 
interrogation such that the custodial setting is 
utilized to facilitate a statement, Miranda is 
inapplicable. Honeyman, supra at 694-695. Here, 
although defendant was in custody for one offense, 
the custodial setting was not used as a coercive tool 
to extract defendant's statements as to other offenses. 
More important, the facts of this case clearly 
demonstrate that the custodial setting did not 
compel defendant's statements to the police. Rather, 
defendant bargained with the prosecutor through 
counsel to give the statements in return for 
immunity from prosecution for the offenses he 
confessed. Further, when defendant made his 
statements to the police, he was represented by two 
attorneys, and both were present while defendant 
spoke to the police. One of the primary Miranda 
rights is to have counsel present during custodial 
interrogation. "If [during questioning] the 
individual states that he wants an attorney, the 
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. 
At that time, the individual must have an 
opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have 
him present during any subsequent questioning." 
Miranda, supra at 474. Indeed, the Miranda Court 
recognized that the presence of counsel dispels the 
compelling atmosphere of custodial interrogation to 
the point of obviating the need for the familiar 
Miranda warnings. "The presence of counsel ... 
would be the adequate protective device necessary 
to make the process of police interrogation conform 
to the dictates of the privilege [against 
self-incrimination]. His presence would insure that 
statements made in the government-established 
atmosphere are not the product of compulsion." Id. 
at 466. 
*5 Because the custodial setting here was not used 
to extract the statements at issue from defendant, 
and because he was represented by counsel when he 
voluntarily gave his statements, plain error 
warranting reversal has not been established by the 
lack of Miranda warnings. 
C. Immunity 
We conclude the immunity agreement defendant 
entered with Texas authorities and immunity 
extended by the Wayne County prosecutor do not 
bar the use of defendant's statements as evidence in 
this Oakland County prosecution. Defendant 
misplaces his reliance on MCL 767.6 and People v. 
Mclntire, 461 Mich. 147; 599 NW2d 102 (1999) to 
argue to the contrary. Defendant was not granted 
immunity under MCL 767.6 or any other statutory 
provision that required defendant to waive his 
privilege against self-incrimination. Instead of 
formal or statutory immunity, this case involves 
nonprosecution agreements commonly referred to 
as "informal immunity" or "pocket immunity." See 
United States v. McFarlane, 309 F3d 510, 513 (CA 
8, 2002), and United States v. Turner, 936 F.2d 
221, 223 (CA 6, 1991). Informal immunity 
agreements grow out of the authority of a 
prosecutor as an executive officer within a 
particular jurisdiction having the discretion to 
decide whether and against whom criminal charges 
will be sought, dismissed, or plea bargained. See, 
e.g., Genesee Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 
391 Mich. 115; 215 NW2d 145 (1974), and 
Genesee Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 386 
Mich. 672; 194 NW2d 693 (1972). Thus, a 
prosecutor or comparable officer in another 
jurisdiction may enter into an agreement with a 
suspect to forego prosecution of a particular offense 
or offenses (transactional immunity), or to not to 
use evidence gained by the suspect's cooperation in 
a later prosecution against the suspect (use 
immunity), in return for testimony, or cooperation 
or a guilty plea in another case. See United States v. 
Eliason, 3 F3d 1149, 1152 (CA 7, 1993); see, also, 
State v. Edmonson, 714 So.2d 1233, 1238 (La, 
1998). 
In contrast to a formal grant of statutory immunity, 
informal immunity agreements are contractual in 
nature and do not generally bind prosecuting 
authorities who are not a party to the agreement. Id. 
at 1237, citing Turner, supra. "Like a plea 
agreement, an immunity agreement is contractual in 
nature and [is] interpreted according to contract law 
principles." United States v. Black, 776 F.2d 1321, 
1326 (CA 6, 1985). The Eighth Circuit Court of 
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Appeals explained: 
When a defendant enters an informal immunity 
agreement with the government rather than asserting 
his Fifth Amendment privilege against being 
compelled to incriminate himself, "the scope of 
informal immunity is governed by the terms of the 
immunity agreement ." United States v. Luloff 15 
F3d 763, 766 (8th Cir, 1994). This is true because 
an immunity agreement is likened to a contract 
between the government and the defendant, a 
concept universally recognized by courts faced with 
enforcing such agreements. See, id., United States 
v. Crawford, 20 F3d 933, 935 (8th Cir, 1994) 
(holding that immunity agreements are analogous to 
plea agreements and are enforced under principles 
of contract law, within the constitutional safeguards 
of due process); United States v. Conway, 81 F3d 
15, 17 (1st Cir, 1996); United States v. Cantu, 185 
F3d 298, 302 (5th Cir, 1999); United States v. 
Brown, 979 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir, 1992); 
United States v. Nyhuis, 8 F3d 731, 742 (11th Cir, 
1993), cert denied, 513 U.S. 808; 115 S Ct 56; 130 
L.Ed.2d 15 (1994). [McFarlane, supra at 514 
(emphasis added).] 
*6 Applying contract principles to the Texas 
immunity agreement, we find it plainly provides 
defendant with transactional immunity from 
prosecution in the jurisdiction of Houston or Harris 
County, Texas. The scope of the immunity is also 
stated to be "the discovery of these bodies or the 
resolution of these murders." Thus, the Harris 
County assistant district attorney promised 
defendant he would not be prosecuted for murders 
for which he leads police to the victim's bodies or 
otherwise "resolves." The nonprosecution 
agreement could extend beyond Houston because 
defendant "agreed he will lead the police to graves 
and assist in clearing the offenses in the cities of 
Austin, Galveston, Texas and the cities of Ann 
Arbor, Michigan; Kalamazoo, Michigan; Detroit, 
Michigan, and Windsor, Ontario, Canada ." But 
immunity does not apply in other jurisdictions 
unless defendant confesses to an offense, and the 
other jurisdiction has agreed in writing not to 
prosecute. 
Defend.iiit .iriiu^ \vc ! "*••••» 
- J'JOG'liiomMHi West, W 
agreement must have included use immunity 
otherwise defendant's Texas lawyers were 
constitutionally ineffective. This claim is without 
merit. Use immunity is required only when a person 
is compelled to waive his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, in the 
face of the assertion of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, immunity to compel testimony 
must be "immunity from use and derivative use 
[that] is coextensive with the scope of the privilege 
against self-incrimination." Kastigar v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 441, 453, 460-61; 92 S Ct 1653; 32 
L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). Such immunity precludes "the 
use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence 
derived directly and indirectly therefrom." Id. The 
fatal flaw in defendant's argument that the Texas 
agreement should have included use immunity is 
that defendant was not compelled to waive his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
Rather, defendant bargained with Texas authorities 
to make his statements regarding the murders he 
perpetrated in return for a promise not to be 
prosecuted for those offenses. Use immunity must 
arise either from the government's promise made 
not to use the evidence or from the defendant's 
being granted immunity after he invoked the 
privilege against self-incrimination. Eliason, supra 
at 1153. Here, the Texas authorities promised only 
that defendant would not be prosecuted for the 
murders he confessed, and defendant was not 
compelled to testify after having invoked his right 
against self-incrimination. 
Foi these reasons, the Texas immunity agreement 
did not preclude the use of defendant's statements 
regarding the Texas murders and assaults in this 
Oakland County prosecution. Accordingly, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. 
The trial court's decision to admit defendant's 
statements regarding the 1979 murder of Jean Clyne 
is more problematic. Then Wayne County 
Prosecutor William Cahalan specifically extended 
use immunity to defendant in return for giving a 
statement regarding that offense Prosecutor 
Cahalan wrote: 
*7 If your office, Mr. Watts and [defendant's] 
attorney are in agreement with providing such an 
•nterview, the Wayne County7 Prosecutor's Office 
.-.- < >!.n. I -' «ii i. Works. 
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will agree not to use any statement obtained during 
this interview in any prosecution of Mr. Watts for 
the Clyne homicide. Furthermore, we will agree not 
to use any information obtained from Mr. Watts' 
statement or evidence developed from information 
contained in his statement, against Mr. Watts in any 
future prosecution. 
Applying contract principles, the trial court ruled 
that neither Oakland County nor the state of 
Michigan was bound by the Wayne County 
agreement because they were not parties, to it. The 
court also noted that the state of Michigan, through 
the Attorney General's supervisory relationship to 
litigation involving the state, never indicated the 
state as a whole would be bound by the agreement. 
See In re Certified Question, 465 Mich. 537, 
545-548; 638 NW2d 409 (2002). 
The trial court correctly ruled on this issue. 
Michigan's statutory scheme in general restricts a 
county prosecutor's authority to crimes occurring 
within the county's geographic boundaries.™2 
FN2. Several venue statutes regarding 
unique situations provide exceptions not 
applicable here. 
The prosecuting attorneys shall, in their respective 
counties, appear for the state or county, and 
prosecute or defend in all the courts of the county, 
all prosecutions, suits, applications and motions, 
whether civil or criminal, in which the state or 
county may be a party or interested. [MCL 49.153 
(emphasis added).] 
Applying MCL 49.153 in an analogous situation, 
this Court has held that a Wayne County assistant 
prosecutor possessed no authority to enter a plea 
bargain in an Oakland County criminal prosecution. 
People v. Stackpoole, 144 Mich.App 291, 300-301; 
375 NW2d 419 (1985). More on point, other 
jurisdictions applying similar state statutory 
schemes have ruled that one county prosecutor has 
no authority to enter an immunity agreement 
purporting to bind another county prosecutor in the 
same state. See State v. Barnett, 124 Ohio App 3d 
746; 707 N.E.2d 564 (1998), and Staten v. Neal, 
880 F.2d 962 (CA 7, 1989) (applying Illinois law). 
Moreover, under contract principles, neither the AG 
nor the Oakland County prosecutor was a party to 
the Wayne County immunity agreement, so they are 
not bound by the agreement from using defendant's 
admissions regarding the Wayne County murder in 
the Oakland County murder prosecution. See 
Edmonson, supra at 1237 ("informal [immunity] 
agreements are contractual in nature and do not as a 
general proposition bind prosecutorial authorities 
who are not a party to the agreement"), and Turner, 
supra at 223 (Informal immunity agreements "are 
contractual in nature and do not bind other parties 
not privy to the original agreement." Id., citing 
United States v. Peister, 631 F.2d 658, 662 (CA 10, 
1980), cert den 449 U.S. 1126; 101 S Ct 945; 67 
L.Ed.2d 113 (1981)). Further, the plain and 
unambiguous language of the agreement bound only 
the Wayne County prosecutor's office from using 
defendant's admission: "the Wayne County 
Prosecutor's Office will agree not to use any 
statement obtained during this interview in any 
prosecution of Mr. Watts for the Clyne homicide. 
Furthermore, we will agree not to use any 
information obtained from Mr. Watts' statement or 
evidence developed from information contained in 
his statement, against Mr. Watts in any future 
prosecution." In context, as used in Prosecutor 
Cahalan's letter "we" can only refer to the 
immediately preceding "Wayne County Prosecutor's 
Office." 
*8 Finally, even if the trial court erred in not 
excluding the evidence of defendant's admissions 
regarding the Wayne County murder on the basis of 
use immunity, because we conclude the evidence of 
the other 16 murders and assaults was properly 
admitted under MRE 404(b), the error would be 
harmless under either the standard for ordinary trial 
error (more probable than not that the error was not 
outcome determinative), Lukity, supra at 495-496, 
or the standard for non structural constitutional 
error (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), 
Cannes, supra at 774. 
D. MRE 404(b) 
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Defendant argues that the ti ial court abused its 
discretion admitting the other acts evidence under 
MRE 404(b). He contends that because the 
prosecutor offered the evidence to prove identity 
through modus operandi, it must satisfy the test 
enunciated in People v. Golochowicz, 413 Mich. 
298; 319 NW2d 518 (1982), which requires: (1) 
substantial evidence that the defendant committed 
the similar act, (2) some special quality of the other 
acts that tends to prove the defendant's identity, (3) 
the evidence be material to the defendant's guilt, 
and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. See People v. Ho, 231 Mich.App 178, 
186; 585 NW2d 357 (i 9«8). We disagree. 
In general, all i evidence is admissible: 
irrelevant evidence is not. MRE 402; Starr, supra 
at 497. But evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of character is generally inadmissible to prove 
action in conformity with the trait of character. Id. 
at 494; MRE 404(a), (b)(1). Thus, the general rule 
is that "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of 
an individual is inadmissible to prove a propensity 
to commit such acts." People v. Crawford, 458 
Mich. 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). The 
evidence, however, may be admitted under MRE 
404(b)(1) to show "motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an 
act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident when the same is material..." To be 
admissible under MRE 404(b)(1), other acts 
evidence: (1) must be offered for a proper purpose, 
i.e., to prove something other than propensity to 
commit like acts, (2) must be relevant under MRE 
402, as enforced through MRE 104(b); and (3) the 
evidence's probative value must not be substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Knox, 
supra at 509; People v. VanderVliet, 444 Mich. 52, 
74-75; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), mod 445 Mich. 
1205 (1994). "Finally, the trial court, upon request, 
may provide a limiting instruction under Rule 105." 
Id. at 75. 
In People v. Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich. 43; 
614 NW2d 888 (2000), our Supreme Court 
reviewed the use of other acts evidence for the 
purpose of showing scheme, plan, or system The 
Court, citing People v. Engelman, 434 Mich "^ 
453 NW2d 656 (1990), noted it had ruled that other 
acts evidence is not limited to establishing identity 
or intent, but rather, other acts evidence "that 
establish a scheme, plan, or system may be material 
in the sense that the evidence proves that the 
charged act was committed." Sabin, supra at 61-62. 
The Court held that "evidence of similar 
misconduct is logically relevant to show that the 
charged act occurred where the uncharged 
misconduct and the charged offense are sufficiently 
similar to support an inference that they are 
manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or 
system." Id. at 63. But more than similarity between 
the charged and uncharged acts is necessary to 
establish the existence of a scheme, plan, or system. 
Id. at 64. Thus, there must not merely be a 
similarity in the results, "but such a concurrence of 
common features that the various acts are naturally 
to be explained as caused by a general plan of 
which they are the individual manifestations." Id. at 
64-65, quoting 2 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn 
rev), § 304, p 249 (emphasis in Wigmore). " T o 
establish the existence of a common design or plan, 
the common features must indicate the existence of 
a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous 
acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be 
distinctive or unusual." ' Sabin, supra at 65-66, 
quoting People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal 4th 380, 402; 867 
P.2d 757 (1994) (emphasis added). 
*9 In Knox, our Supreme Court noted that its 
decisions in Crawford, VanderVliet, and Sabin " 
continue to form the foundation for a proper 
analysis of MRE 404(b)." Knox, supra at 510. The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying 
the principles discussed in these cases and finding 
sufficient common features in the other acts that are 
naturally explained as manifestations of a general 
plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts. 
Sabin, supra at 65-66. Specifically, the trial court 
found the following common features that v.ere 
evidence of a scheme, plan, or system: 
(1) Watts would follow or stalk his female victim; 
(2) the victim was alone; (3) the victim was 
generally a younger woman (between the ages of 19 
and 36, with one victim who was 44); (4) Watts 
would use his Pontiac Grand Prix to identify his 
victim and position himself for the attack; (5) \\ dVs 
would strike without warning, at ra; (\>^n. :v •»• n• 
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kill his victim quickly, through strangling or 
stabbing, without provocation or any familiarity 
with his victim; (6) Watts would not sexually 
assault his victims; and (7) he often took some 
personal item as a memento, not because the item 
had value, but because it was associated with the 
victim. [Trial court opinion and order, 10/8/2004, p 
10.] 
The scheme, plan, or system the trial court 
determined was revealed by the other acts was not 
necessarily "distinctive or unusual." Sabin, supra at 
66. Yet, it does possess some unique elements, such 
as, the use of a particular car to stalk victims, rapid 
attacks, killing by various means available, and lack 
of the usual motives for such random attacks-sex or 
theft. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused 
its discretion when keeping in mind that the 
appellate function is not to decide the issue de novo 
but to determine whether the trial court's decision 
was so palpably and grossly contrary to fact and 
logic that it evidences the perversity of will rather 
than the proper exercise of judgment, Hine, supra at 
250, and that "a trial court's decision on a close 
evidentiary question ordinarily cannot be an abuse 
of discretion." Id. 
Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in finding the other evidence relevant to the proper 
purpose of showing a motive for the murder. " 
Proof of motive in a prosecution for murder, 
although not essential, is always relevant" People v. 
Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich.App 429, 442; 597 
NW2d 843 (1999); see, also People v. Fisher, 449 
Mich. 441, 453; 537 NW2d 577 (1995), holding 
that in a circumstantial murder trial, evidence of 
motive is highly relevant. In considering 
admissibility of other acts evidence, the trial court 
found instructive this Court's decision in People v. 
Hoffman, 225 Mich.App 103; 570 NW2d 146 
(1997). In that case, this Court affirmed the 
admission of other acts evidence tending to 
establish that defendant hated women as evidence 
of the defendant's motive for committing an assault 
with intent to commit murder. Id. at 104. The 
evidence consisted of "testimony from two women 
whom [the] defendant had allegedly assaulted and 
battered and to whom he had expressed his general 
hatred toward women." Id. The Hoffman Court, in 
turn relied on a New Jersey appellate decision that 
affirmed the admission evidence of racial animus as 
motive to " 'to explain an otherwise inexplicable 
act of random violence." ' Hoffman, supra at 109, 
quoting New Jersey v. Crumb, 277 NJ Super 311, 
317; 649 A.2d 879 (App.Div., 1994). The Hoffman 
panel opined: "Similar to the evidence of racism in 
Crumb, evidence that defendant hates women and 
previously had acted on such hostility establishes 
more than character or propensity. Here, the 
other-acts evidence was relevant and material to 
[the] defendant's motive for his unprovoked, cruel, 
and sexually demeaning attack on his victim." So, 
too, the other acts evidence here showed motive to 
explain what otherwise might seem to be an 
unexplainable, vicious murder. 
*10 The trial court also did not abuse its discretion 
in admitting the other acts evidence for the purpose 
of showing intent, the necessary element in a charge 
of first-degree murder of premeditation and 
deliberation. Contrary to defendant's argument, the 
testimony of eyewitness Foy by itself could not 
establish that element because it was susceptible of 
being explained as a sudden affray between lovers 
or strangers. The admission of the other acts 
evidence showing scheme, plan, or system 
permitted the inference that defendant stalked 
Dutcher in his Pontiac and deliberately, with 
premeditation, killed her. 
We also find that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the probative value of 
the other acts evidence was not outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403. The trial 
court correctly reasoned the evidence was not 
marginally probative but rather powerful evidence 
of motive, and more specifically of premeditation 
and deliberation. The evidence operated not through 
a direct propensity of showing defendant killed on 
other occasions so he killed in this instance, but 
through the inferences that defendant killed for a 
reason (motive) and while using a particular method 
(scheme, plan or system), which together also was 
probative of premeditation and deliberation. 
Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury to limit 
the use of the other acts evidence to its proper 
purposes. MRE 105; VanderVliet, supra at 75. The 
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trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
Defendant's reliance on the "special quality" test of 
Golochowicz is misplaced because the evidence was 
properly admitted for proper purposes other than 
identity. "That our Rules of Evidence preclude the 
use of evidence for one purpose simply does not 
render the evidence inadmissible for other purposes. 
" Sabin, supra at 56. Further, in considering the 
admissibility of evidence under MRE 404(b), a 
proponent of the evidence need only establish that 
the evidence is relevant to one proper, noncharacter 
purpose to secure its admission. Starr, supra at 501. 
Accordingly, even if the evidence was not 
admissible under Golochowicz to directly prove 
identity, error warranting reversal did not occur. 
E . - l e a i ^ a \ " . ! * ! [ : ) • . . . •• •'.;•••• 
Defendant next argues that portions of the other acts 
evidence consisted of inadmissible hearsay, such as 
vital statistics of murder victims and testimony 
regarding crime scenes. Defendant asserts this 
violated his constitutional right of confrontation. 
We hold defendant has waived this argument. '',.""..• 
Defendant did not properly preserve a hearsay 
objection either by raising it in the trial court or by 
identifying it in his statement of questions 
presented. MCR 7.212(C)(5); People v. Brown, 239 
Mich.App 735, 748; 610 NW2d 234 (2000). 
Defendant's failure to preserve and properly present 
this claim, and his less than cursory treatment on 
brief constitutes abandonment of the claim. See 
People v. Harris, 261 Mich.App 44, 50; 680 NW2d 
17 (2004), and People v. Watson, 245 Mich.App 
572, 587; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). 
F. Hallway Demonstration ' . ' . - . " 
*11 During the presentation of the defense case, 
defense counsel set up a demonstration in the 
hallway outside the courtroom to impeach 
eyewitness Foy. Defendant now argues it was a 
marginal demonstration and that plain error 
occurred when defense counsel did not object to 
testimony noting differences between the actual 
time and place when the crime occurred and the 
hallway demonstration. In essence, defendant 
argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 
allowing the demonstration rather than permitting a 
view of the scene. We disagree. 
Error warranting reversal did not occur because a 
party cannot obtain relief on appeal for an alleged 
error at trial to which the complaining party " 
contributed by plan or negligence." People v. 
Griffin, 235 Mich.App 27, 46, 597 NW2d 176 
(1999). Here, defendant cannot introduce evidence 
at trial and claim on appeal that error occurred in its 
admission. People v. Knapp, 244 Mich.App 361, 
378; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). 
;..;,,'••.;'.• n D N A Evidence •.•.-.-.'-.• 
Next, defendant argues that plain error occurred, at 
trial when D N A evidence was admitted in evidence 
without a proper foundation that the police testing 
procedures and statistical data were reliable. M R E 
702; Gilbert v. Daimler Chrysler Corp, 470 Mich. 
749} 779-783; 685 NW2d 391 (2004). Defendant 
contends that the improper admission of the DNA 
evidence violated defendant's substantial rights 
because it established "the res gestae and thereby 
convicting the defendant." In addition, defendant 
argues that defense counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to the lack of foundation for the 
DNA evidence. We disagree. 
Tlie prosecution used the DNA evidence to 
establish that blood found on and around Dutcher's 
body was in fact that of the victim. Although we 
agree with plaintiff that a sufficient foundation for 
the admission of this evidence was established, 
defendant cannot satisfy his burden of establishing 
the prejudice necessary to warrant reversal even if 
plain error occurred. Defense counsel 
cross-examined the prosecution's expert as follows: 
Q. Did you find DNA from anybody, any other 
foreign DNA at all. 
4. No, I did not 
Q. So, basically, what you are here to tell the jury 
today is that you tested all this blood and we know 
that Helen Dutcher's blood was found at the scene 
of her murder. 
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A. That is correct. 
Q. And, there is no other blood or DNA from any 
other human being at all, nothing else? 
A. Not in the samples that were submitted to me, no. 
Q. So, just to make sure we are clear about this. 
Nothing linking Coral Watts, from your point of 
view. 
A. Not in the samples that were submitted to me, no. 
So, in the span of a few questions, defense counsel, 
without objecting to the expert's qualifications, the 
PCR methodology, the procedures and equipment 
actually employed, or the database underlying the 
statistical analysis, established that the prosecution 
had absolutely no physical evidence linking 
defendant to the murder of Helen Dutcher. 
Consequently, defendant cannot establish he was 
prejudiced by the admission of the DNA evidence. 
So, even if evidentiary error occurred in the 
admission of the DNA evidence, and the error was 
preserved, it would not warrant reversal. Lukity, 
supra at 495-496. Likewise, defendant has failed to 
establish either outcome-determinative error or 
overcome the presumption that counsel's tactics 
constituted sound trial strategy. Thus, defendant's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. People 
v. Rodgers, 248 Mich.App 702, 714-715; 645 
NW2d 294 (2001). -.',.-. , ^ 
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ; 
*12 Defendant argues that although his primary 
defense was identification, his counsel was 
constitutionally deficient by not raising insanity as 
an alternative defense. We conclude defendant has 
failed to overcome the strong presumption that 
counsel's representation was within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance and that under 
the circumstances might be considered sound trial 
strategy. 
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the 
defendant bears a heavy burden of proving 
otherwise. People v. LeBlanc, 465 Mich. 575, 578; 
640 NW2d 246 (2002). Appellate review of a claim 
of ineffective assistance involves a determination 
(1) whether counsel's performance was objectively 
unreasonable and (2) whether the defendant was 
prejudiced by the defective performance. People v. 
Toma, 462 Mich. 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 
(2000). To establish prejudice, a defendant must 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. Id. 
Although the issue defendant presents on appeal is 
whether defense counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective, the body of his argument is no more 
than an argument for a remand to the trial court for 
a hearing pursuant to People v. Ginther, 390 Mich. 
436, 212 NW2d 922 (1973) so that he can search 
for a basis to establish his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. But this Court has already denied 
defendant's motion to remand, which asserted the 
same arguments. Unpublished order of the Court of 
Appeals issued September 7, 2005 (Docket No. 
259903). Defendant asserts the same factual 
predicate regarding his claim of ineffective 
assistance in his brief on appeal as he asserted in his 
motion for remand. Specifically, defendant refers to 
his own apparent unsworn statements to the author 
of the presentence information report that "he had 
been diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1982," and 
that he "use[d] ... marijuana from 1973 to 1975." 
To establish his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, defendant must show both (1) he could 
have presented a viable insanity defense at trial 
(prejudice) and (2) either counsel failed to 
reasonably investigate the defense or unreasonably 
failed to pursue it (serious error rather than 
reasonable trial strategy). See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 690-691; 104 S Ct 
2052; 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and LeBlanc, supra 
at 578. 
With respect to whether defendant could have 
presented a viable defense at trial, he must have 
some evidence that at the time of the offense he had 
both a mental illness and lacked the substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the nature and quality 
or the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law. MCL 
768.21a(l).FN3 We find that defendant's claim that. 
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he is now entitled to an evaluation under MCL 
768.20a(3) is mistaken. The statutory scheme is 
clear. An accused who desires to raise the defense 
of insanity at trial must give notice of his intent to 
do so "not less than 30 days before the date set for 
the trial of the case." MCL 768.20a(l). The notice 
of insanity defense triggers a requirement that the 
accused "undergo an examination relating to his or 
her claim of insanity by personnel of the center for 
forensic psychiatry or by other qualified personnel, 
as applicable." MCL 768.20a(l). Thereafter, both 
the defendant and the prosecution have the right to 
an independent evaluation. MCL 768.20a(3). See 
Toma, supra at 292, n 6. Here, defendant never 
invoked this process by giving notice before trial of 
an intent to raise insanity as a defense. The purpose 
of the statute is "to give an indigent criminal 
defendant the opportunity to prepare a defense of 
insanity at public expense," People v. McPeters, 
181 MichApp 145, 151; 448 NW2d 770 (1989), 
not to afford an opportunity to go fishing for 
post-conviction relief. 
FN3. Both plaintiff and defendant 
mistakenly assume that had defendant 
asserted insanity as a defense at trial he 
would have had the burden of establishing 
that affirmative defense by the 
preponderance of the evidence. But this 
Court has held that the application of MCL 
768.21a, as amended by 1994 PA 56, to 
offenses occurring before the effective date 
of its amendment violates the Ex Post 
Facto Clauses of the federal and state 
constitutions, U.S. Const, art I, § 9, cl 3; 
Const 1963, art 1, § 10. People v. 
McRunels, 237 Mich.App 168; 603 NW2d 
95 (1999). Before October 1, 1994, a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding was 
presumed sane but once any evidence of 
insanity was introduced the prosecution 
bore the burden of establishing defendant's 
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. People 
v. Stephan, 241 Mich.App 482, 488-489; 
616 NW2d 188 (2000); People v. Bailey, 
142 MichApp 571, 572-573; 370 NW2d 
628 (1985). The definition of legal insanity 
was substantially the same in 1979 as it is 
Page 11 
currently. See People v. Crawford, 89 
MichApp 30, 35; 279NW2d 560 (1979). 
*13 The real questions raised by defendant's claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel is what 
information defense counsel possessed when 
preparing for trial and whether strategic choices 
counsel made based on that information were 
objectively unreasonable under prevailing 
professional norms. "The reasonableness of 
counsel's actions may be determined or substantially 
influenced by the defendant's own statements or 
actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite 
properly, on informed strategic choices made by the 
defendant and on information supplied by the 
defendant." Strickland, supra at 691. Here, while 
defendant moved to remand for a Ginther hearing, 
he neither supplied his own affidavit nor the 
affidavit of defense counsel to shed any light on 
these questions. Thus, defendant failed to comply 
with MCR 7.211(C)(1) by providing an offer of 
proof regarding the facts to be established on 
remand. 
"The role of defense counsel is to choose the best 
defense for the defendant under the circumstances." 
People v. Pickens, 446 Mich. 298, 325; 521 NW2d 
797 (1994). Moreover, counsel has broad discretion 
in making strategic trial choices. Id. Thus, appellate 
scrutiny of counsel's decisions must be highly 
deferential. Strickland, supra at 689. Here, the 
available record reveals that counsel effectively 
pursued the defense of misidentification. Indeed, 
defendant concedes on appeal that identification 
was his primary defense. Nevertheless, defendant 
contends he could have also pursued the 
inconsistent defense of insanity without 
undermining his primary defense by convincing the 
trial court permit a bifurcated trial. Although, this 
Court has held it within the trial court's discretion to 
bifurcate a trial, those cases uphold trial courts in 
denying such requests by defendants. See People v. 
Furman, 158 Mich.App 302, 320; 404 NW2d 246 
(1987), and People v. Meatte, 98 MichApp 74, 79; 
296 NW2d 190 (1980). As this Court has noted, " 
[t]he right of a defendant to raise alternative 
defenses does not imply a concomitant right to 
sketch each defense on the clean slate of a naive 
jury" Id. 
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A defendant presenting a claim of ineffective 
assistance must overcome the strong presumption 
that counsel's representation was within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance and that 
under the circumstances might be considered sound 
trial strategy. LeBlanc, supra at 578, citing 
Strickland, supra at 689. Counsel is not ineffective 
when choosing one defense over another, particular 
when in counsel's professional judgment one of the 
defenses has a greater chance of success in light of 
available evidence. People v. Lloyd, 459 Mich. 
433, 449; 590 NW2d 738 (1999); People v. 
LaVearn, 448 Mich. 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 
(1995). In the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary, this Court must presume that defense 
counsel's decision to pursue defendant's primary 
defense of misidentification was a matter of 
reasonable professional judgment and sound trial 
strategy. "This Court will not substitute its 
judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of 
trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel's 
competence with the benefit of hindsight." People 
v. Bailey, 175 Mich.App 743, 747; 483 NW2d 344 
(1989). Consequently, defendant has failed to 
overcome the strong presumption that counsel's 
representation was constitutionally adequate. 
regarding what prejudicial information this juror 
could have possibly learned that could have been 
passed to other jurors to deny defendant a fair and 
impartial trial. Defendant has simply failed to 
satisfy his burden of persuasion that the 
circumstances regarding the removed juror create 
an inference that defendant's right to a fair and 
impartial trial was prejudiced. We conclude that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
We affirm. 
Mich.App.,2006. 
People v. Watts 
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2006 WL 2271304 
(MicLApp.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
IV. Mistrial 
*14 Defendant argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by not granting his motion for mistrial 
after it was revealed a juror visited the crime scene. 
"The grant or denial of a motion for a mistrial is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and 
absent a showing of prejudice, reversal is not 
warranted." People v. Wells, 238 Mich.App 383, 
390; 605 NW2d 374 (1999). To warrant reversal, 
the court's ruling "must be so grossly in error as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial or amount to a 
miscarriage of justice." Id. 
Here, the trial court properly removed the wayward 
juror and substituted an alternate juror with the 
consent of both the prosecutor and defendant. 
Defendant offers no argument on how a lone 
removed juror's unauthorized view of an area where 
the crime had occurred years ago caused him 
prejudice. Nor has defendant offered any argument 
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Superior Court of Maine. 
STATE of Maine 
V . 
Patrick ALEXANDRE 
No.CR-01-847. 
May 16, 2003. 
JABAR, J. 
*1 Pending before the Court is Patrick Alexandre's 
(the "Defendant") Motion to Suppress. Donald F. 
Brown, Esq., for the Defendant and Assistant 
Attorney General, Fernald LaRochelle for the State. 
For the following reasons the Court denies the 
Defendant's motion. 
Background 
The Defendant contacted the Maine State Police 
while incarcerated at the Penobscot County Jail on a 
West Virginia fugitive from justice charge. He 
stated in a note that he wished to talk to 
investigators about a murder. Sgt. Vicki Gardner, 
Trooper Seth Edwards and Trooper Scott Hamilton 
responded to the note and Trooper Edwards advised 
the Defendant of his Miranda rights. The Defendant 
indicated that he would only talk to specific officers 
and wanted to speak to his attorney. 
On or about November 27, 2000, Maine State 
Police Special Agent Kenneth MacMaster (" 
MacMaster") met with the Defendant and his 
attorney Christopher Smith. The Defendant and his 
attorney had time to consult before and during the 
interview. MacMaster did not advise the Defendant 
of his Miranda rights. There was an initial 
discussion about what the Defendant wanted in 
exchange for his information and eventually the 
Defendant revealed that he was referring to the 
murder of Joseph Cloak. The Defendant then gave 
some general information about the location of 
Clark's body. 
On November 28, 2000, the Defendant, attorney 
Smith and an Assistant United States Attorney 
reviewed a proffer agreement that the Defendant 
eventually signed. After signing the proffer 
agreement Detective Steve Pickering, MacMaster 
and Sgt. Christopher Coleman meet with the 
Defendant and attorney Smith. It appears that 
attorney Smith was present for most, but not all of 
the interview. Detective Pickering advised the 
Defendant of his Miranda rights before beginning 
the interview. After reviewing the fact that the 
police were not making the Defendant any 
promises, and that he had no immunity for crimes of 
violence, the Defendant told the police how Cloak 
disappeared. The Defendant told the officers that he 
could take them to the burial site and he and 
attorney Smith agreed that he would go with the 
officers the next day. The parties understood that 
attorney Smith would not be present during this trip. 
On November 29, 2000, the Defendant, MacMaster, 
and other police officers traveled from the 
Penobscot County Jail to Bradford, Maine. Attorney 
Smith was not present during the trip to Bradford 
and no one advised the Defendant of his Miranda 
rights. The police eventually recovered the body, 
On December 1, 2000, the Defendant went to the 
U.S. Attorney's office for an interview. Attorney 
Smith was present during most of the interview. No 
one advised the Defendant of his Miranda rights but 
attorney Smith agreed that the Miranda waiver from 
November 28, 2000, was still in effect. The 
Defendant discussed his reasons for coming forward 
and acknowledged that he wished to "beat" the 
charges in West Virginia. He noted that although he 
did not get exactly what he wanted he was going to 
continue to provide information. At some point 
there was a discussion about a polygraph test and 
the Defendant stated he would leave the decision, up 
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to attorney Smith. Towards the end of the interview 
attorney Smith announced that he needed to leave. 
The Defendant stated that he would continue the 
interview and would refuse to answer questions he 
did not feel comfortable answering.1^1 
FN1. The Defendant refers to a separate 
interview on December 1, 2000. However 
the State has not sought to introduce any 
statements made during this interview. 
Even if the police needed to advise the 
Defendant of his Miranda rights during the 
interview, failure to advise is not a 
constitutional violation. The Fifth 
Amendment does not guarantee Miranda 
warnings or the presence of counsel; those 
are court created prophylactic procedures. 
The Fifth Amendment only protects 
against self-incrimination. Since the State 
does not intend to introduce statements 
made during this interview the Fifth 
Amendment is not implicated. 
*2 On December 2, 2000, the Defendant left the 
Penobscot County Jail and was taken to the 
Criminal Investigation Division of the Maine State 
Police at the Bangor Mental Health Institute to take 
a polygraph test. The police informed the Defendant 
and attorney Smith that attorney Smith could not be 
present in the testing room during the actual 
examination. Before beginning the examination 
Detective Keegan went over a two-page document 
detailing the polygraph procedures.FN2 Detective 
Keegan then read the Defendant his Miranda rights. 
At some point the Defendant stated, "I can have my 
attorney present when being questioned?" Detective 
Keegan replied, "present, means present in the 
building." At this time the Defendant asked to speak 
with his attorney and have him look over the waiver 
form before he signed it. Detective Keegan left the 
room and upon his return advised the Defendant 
that attorney Smith signed the waiver and stated that 
Attorney Smith advised him to sign it. FN3 During 
the examination Detective Pickering watched 
through an observation room. It is not clear if 
attorney Smith was aware that he could observe 
from this location. 
FN2. The Defendant notes that he cannot 
read without his glasses and states he did 
not have them at that time. However there 
is no evidence that the Defendant ever 
signed anything that he did not read and 
further the evidence shows that the 
Defendant was never in a situation where 
his eyesight hindered his understanding of 
any documents. 
FN3. Due to the Court's decision in this 
matter it is not necessary to examine 
whether this was a valid waiver. 
After the polygraph examination Detective Keegan 
briefly left the room and returned to inform the 
Defendant that had failed the exam. At this time 
Detective Pickering and Detective Keegan 
interviewed the Defendant in the presence of 
attorney Smith. During this interview the Defendant 
privately consulted with attorney Smith twice. After 
consultation, and a reminder that he could still face 
prison time in West Virginia, the Defendant 
changed his story regarding Cloak's death. After 
each consultation with Attorney Smith the 
interviewing officers noticed that the Defendant 
sanitized his story. The Defendant told the officers 
that he did not want to make certain statements 
without first talking to Attorney Smith. He told the 
officers that he contacted the police regarding 
Cloak's death because he wanted to go home and he 
acknowledged that he made a mistake by not being 
completely honest from the start. 
On December 7, 2000, Detective Pickering and 
Detective Keegan interviewed the Defendant, in the 
presence of attorney Smith.FN4 No one advised the 
Defendant of his Miranda rights at this interview. 
Attorney Smith and the Defendant reviewed a 
proffer agreement from the Maine Attorney 
General's Office that the Defendant eventually 
signed. The Defendant reviewed his earlier 
statements with the officers and stated that he 
wanted to work with the police and put the matter 
behind him. He acknowledged that he could not 
play games and the police informed him that if he 
could not give verifiable information there was no 
sense in continuing. The Defendant then gave 
another version of the circumstances surrounding 
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Cloak's death. Eventually the Defendant was 
indicted and arrested for the murder of Joseph 
Cloak. 
FN4. The Defendant mentions an interview 
that allegedly occurred on December 3, 
2000. However, the State has not sought to 
introduce any statements made during this 
interview. Even if the police needed to 
advise the Defendant of his Miranda rights 
during the interview, failure to advise is 
not a constitutional violation. The Fifth 
Amendment does not guarantee Miranda 
warnings or the presence of counsel; those 
are court created prophylactic procedures. 
The Fifth Amendment only protects 
against self-incrimination. Since the State 
does not intend to introduce statements 
made during this interview the Fifth 
Amendment is not implicated. 
The Defendant seeks to have his statements 
suppressed and alleges that the police failed to 
properly advise him of his Miranda rights in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment and violated his 
Sixth Amendment Right to counsel. The Defendant 
further alleges that due to a history of drug abuse 
and mental illness his statements were not voluntary. 
Discussion 
Sixth Amendment 
*3 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not 
attach until a defendant has reached a critical stage 
in a criminal proceeding. State v. Bavouset, 2001 
ME 141, U 4, 784 A.2d 27. In other words, the 
Sixth Amendment is not triggered until the State 
brings criminal charges. Jenness v. Nicker son, 637 
A.2d 1152, 1156 (Me.1994). It is clear that at the 
time the Defendant made his statements the State 
had not charged the Defendant with any crime 
relating to Cloak's death and therefore he did not 
have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
Miranda 
November 26-December 2 
The police must advise a suspect of his Miranda FN5 
rights before subjecting him to custodial 
interrogation. State v. Higgins, 2002 ME 77, ^ 12, 
796 A.2d 50. "Custodial interrogation" is 
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers of 
a person in custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way. Id 
(internal citations omitted). Therefore, in order for 
Miranda to apply, a person must be in custody and 
subject to interrogation. The Court concludes that 
the Defendant was not in custody for Miranda 
purposes during the interviews dated November 27, 
2000, through the polygraph examination on 
December 2, 2000, and that even if the Defendant 
was in custody he was not subject to interrogation. 
The Court further concludes that even if the 
Defendant was in custody and subject to 
interrogation the police did not need to advise the 
Defendant of his Miranda rights because counsel 
was actually present. 
FN5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). 
A defendant is in custody if he is under formal 
arrest or subject to a "restraint on freedom of 
movement to the degree associated with formal 
arrest." Id (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 
U.S 318, 322 (1994)). It is undisputed that the 
Defendant was in custody in the Penobscot County 
Jail. The United States Supreme Court, in Mathis v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968), stated that " 
nothing in the Miranda opinion ... calls for the 
curtailment of the warnings to be given persons 
under interrogation by officers based on the reason 
why the person is in custody." The fact that a 
person is incarcerated for a crime, different from 
one police are presently investigating, does not 
remove the need for Miranda warnings. 
However Mathis did not stand for the premise that 
every incarcerated person is in custody for the 
purposes of Miranda. United States v. Chamberlain, 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Not Reported in A.2d Page 4 
Not Reported in A.2d, 2003 WL 21387159 (Me.Super.) 
(Cite as: Not Reported in A.2d) 
163 F.3d 499, 502 (8th Cir.l998).FN6 Incarceration 
does not ipso facto constitute custody. Id; Alston v. 
Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1245 n. 6 (3rd Cir.1994); 
United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15 (2nd 
Cir.1988). The Supreme Court itself noted, "the 
bare fact of custody may not in every instance 
require a warning." Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 
292, 299 (1990). Other Courts have noted that to 
create a per se rule that all investigatory questioning 
that occurs inside a prison requires Miranda 
warnings would disrupt prison administration and 
would create a situation in which Miranda provides 
greater protection to prisoners than to 
nonimprisoned individuals. United States v. Menzer, 
29 F.3d 1223, 1231 (7th Cir.l994)(citing 
Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 427 n. 7 (9th 
Cir.1978). 
FN6. The Court notes that the First Circuit 
(and various other courts), citing Mathis 
has held that a prison inmate was in 
custody for Miranda purposes. Palmigiano 
v. Baxter, 510 F.2d 534 (1s t Cir.1974) 
(rev'd on other grounds). However, those 
courts did not address whether Mathis 
created an ipso facto rule regarding 
custody. See United States v. Conley, 779 
F.2d 970, 972 n. 3 (4th Cir.1985). 
*4 Incarceration is however relevant and the Court 
must include the fact of incarceration in its custody 
determination. Chamberlain, 163 F.3d at 502. The 
prison setting may increase the likelihood that an 
inmate is in custody. United States v. Smith, 1 F.3d 
1164, 1167 (5th Cir.l993)(noting that it is generally 
accepted that an inmate is not always "in custody" 
for Miranda purposes). The Court examines the 
totality of the circumstances to determine whether 
an inmate is "in custody". Menzer, 29 F.3d at 1232, 
State v. Higgins, 2002 ME 77, t 13 796 A.2d 50. 
In non-prison settings a defendant is in custody if he 
is under formal arrest or subject to a "restraint on 
freedom of movement to the degree associated with 
formal arrest." State v. Higgins, 2002 ME at U 12. 
Applying the traditional custody test to individuals 
in prison would result in a per se finding that all 
incarcerated persons are "in custody" that, as 
discussed above, does not follow from the Supreme 
Court's decisions concerning Miranda and prison 
inmates. Conley 779 F.2d at 973. 
To determine whether a prisoner was "in custody" 
for Miranda purposes Courts have considered 
whether an inmate was subjected to more than the 
usual restraint on his liberty, Id (citing Cervantes, 
589 F.2d at 428); and whether there was a measure 
of compulsion beyond confinement, Willoughby, 
860 F.2d at 24. The Court in Chamberlain, citing 
United States v. Griffin, 922 F .2d 1343, 1349, (8th 
Cir.1990), used a six factor analysis to determine 
whether an inmate was in custody. The Court 
focused on whether (1) the suspect knew the 
questioning was voluntary and knew he was either 
free to leave or free to request the officers to leave; 
(2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained 
freedom of movement during questioning; (3) 
whether the suspect initiated contact or acquiesced 
to official requests; (4) what types of tactics were 
used during questioning; (5) whether the 
atmosphere was police dominated; or (6) whether 
the suspect was placed under arrest after 
questioning. Chamberlain, 163 F.3d at 503. The list 
is not exhaustive and the issue focuses upon the 
totality of the circumstances. Id. 
The Colorado Supreme Court, citing Cervantes, 
considers (1) the language used to summon the 
individual, (2) the physical surroundings of the 
interrogation; (3) the extent to which he is 
confronted with evidence of his guilt; and (4) the 
additional pressure exerted to detain him. People v. 
Denison, 918 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Co.1996). The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts accurately 
sums up the variety of tests and determines whether 
"the prisoner would reasonably believe himself to 
be in custody beyond that imposed by the confines 
of ordinary prison life." Commonwealth v. 
Girouard, 766 N.E.2d 873, 880 (Ma.2002). 
Turning to the present matter, the Court agrees that 
neither Miranda nor Mathis establishes a per se rule 
that all questioning of incarcerated persons requires 
Miranda warnings. The Court will examine the 
totality of the circumstances to determine if a 
reasonable person would believe himself to be in 
custody beyond that normally associated with 
prison life. 
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*5 The Court notes that the Defendant voluntarily 
contacted the police and offered to provide 
information regarding a murder. The Defendant 
offers no evidence to suggest that he was ever in 
custody beyond what one would normally associate 
with prison life. Although not required the 
investigators read the Defendant his Miranda rights 
before the initial interview and the interviews on 
November 28 and December 2. The Defendant 
frequently stopped the proceedings to speak with 
his attorney and receive advice supporting the 
conclusion that the Defendant understood he was 
acting voluntarily. In fact the Defendant stated that 
he would not answer questions that he did not want 
to, indicating the police were not exerting pressure. 
The Defendant negotiated two proffer agreements 
with the assistance of counsel but there is no 
evidence that the officers made any additional 
promises or exerted any pressure on the Defendant. 
The Defendant stated numerous times that the was 
coming forward to "get this behind him" and move 
on with his life. Considering the fact that the 
Defendant was incarcerated, there was not an 
overbearing police dominated atmosphere. The 
Defendant spoke with his attorney and even 
requested specific officers. Although the interviews 
were lengthy neither the Defendant nor his attorney 
objected. The Defendant was not arrested until after 
the grand jury indicated him. 
Additionally, the officers involved did not consider 
the Defendant a suspect until some time after the 
polygraph test.1^7 The Supreme Court has stated, " 
a police officer's view that the individual under 
questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not 
bear upon the question whether the individual is in 
custody for purposes of Miranda." Stansbury v. 
California, 511 U.S. 318, 329 (1994). However, an 
officer's knowledge or beliefs may bear upon the 
custody issue if the officer conveys those beliefs. Id 
at 300. 
FN7. There is no evidence that the officers 
relayed their suspicion to the Defendant 
after the polygraph examination. 
Therefore, the fact that the Defendant was 
a suspect after the polygraph does 
necessarily indicate the Defendant was "in 
custody". Considering the Court's decision 
below, concerning the post-polygraph 
interviews, it is not necessary to determine 
whether the Defendant was "in custody" or 
subject to "interrogation" after the 
•*•/. polygraph examination. 
The present situation is a clear instance where the 
officers conveyed their belief that the Defendant 
was not a suspect. The Defendant approached the 
officers as a witness, the Defendant was operating 
under two proffer agreements, the officers never 
accused the Defendant of the crime, never 
confronted the Defendant with evidence tending to 
point to the Defendant's guilt, and never treated the 
Defendant as anything but a witness. 
The Court is free to consider the fact that a 
defendant was not a suspect when determining 
whether the defendant was subjected to custodial 
interrogation. O'Donnell v. State, 374 S.E.2d 729, 
732 (Ga.l989)(a person is not in custody when 
being questioned if not a suspect); State v. Longley, 
483 A.2d 725, 730 (Me. 1984); Commonwealth v. 
Gil, All N.E.2d 30, 37 (Ma.l984)(evidence 
showing the defendant was not a suspect at the time 
of questioning and that the interview was devoid of 
attempts to compel a statement was indicative of a 
non-custodial interview); New Jersey v. Seefeldt, 
242 A.2d 322, 327 (N.J. 1968); State v. Beaucage, 
CR-85-128, 1985 Me.Super. LEXIS 368, 12 
(December 19, 1985, Me.Super.Ct); Minnesota v. 
Johnson, C2-97-1384, 1998 Minn.App. LEXIS 
496, *5 (May 5, 1998, Court of Appeals of 
Minnesota) FN8 (the officer's questions were an 
investigation of a witness not a custodial 
interrogation of a suspect); Zavala v. Texas, 956 
S.W.2d 715, 724 (Ct.App. Tx., Thirteenth District, 
1997). 
FN8. Cited pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 
480A.08, SUBD. 3. 
*6 Considering the above, the Court is satisfied that 
the Defendant was not "in custody" for Miranda 
purposes. Further the fact that the police treated the 
Defendant as a witness, and that the Defendant 
understood the police were treating him as a 
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witness, supports a conclusion that even if the 
Defendant was "in custody" he was not subject to " 
interrogation" and therefore Miranda warnings were 
not necessary. The Supreme Court defined " 
interrogation" as a "practice that the police should 
know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating 
response from a suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 
446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)(emphasis added). 
Miranda does not work to prevent an individual in 
custody from talking with the police without the 
benefit of warnings and counsel, but only prevents 
the police from interrogating an individual in 
custody. Wilson v. Schomig, 234, F.Supp.2d 851, 
865 (C.D.IL.2002)(citing Miranda at 478). 
The Court in Wilson held that because the police 
did not consider the defendant a suspect, the 
officer's questions were not designed to elicit 
incriminating statements and therefore did not 
amount to interrogation. Wilson, 234 F.Supp. at 
866. When police are investigating a crime and 
interviewing witnesses there is no motivation to 
engage in the type of conduct Miranda prohibits and 
therefore Miranda warnings are not necessary. 
Boutwell v. State, 344 S.E.2d 222, 226 (Ga.1986). 
Police questioning of individuals in custody does 
not trigger Miranda unless the purpose of the 
questioning is to obtain a confession from a suspect. 
Corbin v. Indiana, 563 N.E.2d 86, 90 (In.l990).FN9 
The police do not need to give Miranda warnings 
to every witness they question during the criminal 
fact finding process. State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 
1, 12 (N.D.I97l)(citing Miranda ); Commonwealth 
v. Horner, 442 A.2d 682, 686 n. 10 (Pa. 1982); State 
v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1043 (R.I.2000). 
FN9. Contra, State of Ohio v. Holt, 725 
N.E.2d 1155, 1158-59 (Court of Appeals 
of Ohio, First Appellate District, 1997) 
(holding, in a case involving a prisoner in 
custody due to pretrial detention, that " 
when an individual is in custody for an 
unrelated matter, any form of police 
questioning about another crime is 
interrogation and requires the recitation of 
Miranda warnings, regardless of whether 
the individual is a suspect or a witness." 
)(citing People v. Lee, 630 P.2 583 
(Co.1981), certiorari denied, 454 U.S. 
1162(1982)). 
The police presented testimony that they did not 
consider the Defendant a suspect until sometime 
after the polygraph examination. The Defendant 
voluntarily approached the police and offered 
information regarding Cloak's murder. At no time 
before the failed polygraph did the police have any 
reason to suspect the Defendant and the Defendant's 
actions confirm that he believed the police were 
treating him as a witness. Considering the above, 
even if the Defendant was in custody for Miranda 
purposes the police did not interrogate him. The 
police were involved in general investigatory fact 
finding and treated the Defendant as a witness. 
Even if the Defendant was in custody and the police 
subjected him to interrogation they were not 
required to advise the Defendant of his Miranda 
rights because counsel was actually present. 
Attorney Smith was present on November 27, 2000, 
November 28, 2000, December 1, 2000, and 
December 2, 2000 both before and after the 
polygraph examination. Fidelity to the Miranda 
doctrine requires courts to strictly enforce it, but 
only in those situations "in which the concerns that 
powered the decision are implicated." Illinois v. 
Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296(quoting Berkemer v. 
McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984)). The 
presence of counsel ensures that police 
interrogations conform to the dictates of the Fifth 
Amendment and ensures that a Defendant's 
statements are not the product of compulsion. 
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 152 (1990) 
(citing Miranda 384 U.S. at 466). Therefore when 
counsel is present the "concerns that powered the 
decision" are not implicated. Miranda warnings are 
not necessary when counsel is present. United 
States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N 
.Y.1991); People v. Mounts, 784 P.2d 792, 796 
(Co.l990)(citing United States v. Thevis, 469 
F.Supp. 490, 507-508 (D.Conn.1979), affd 614F.2d 
1293 (2nd Cir.1979); Baxter v. State, 331 S.E.2d 
561, 568 (Ga.1985). The presence of counsel 
renders Miranda warnings unnecessary and 
superfluous. Collins v. Delaware, 420 A.2d 170, 
176 (De.l980)(citing United States v. Falcone, 544 
F.2d607(2ndCir.l976).FN10 
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FN10. On November 29, 2000, the 
Defendant accompanied the police to 
Bradford to recover Cloak's body. Even if 
the Defendant was in custody and subject 
to interrogation, and after considering the 
test the Law Court articulated in State v. 
Myers, 345 A.2d 500, 502 (Me. 1975), the 
Court concludes that the police did not 
need to re-advise the Defendant of his 
Miranda rights during the trip to Bradford. 
See State v. Smith, 675 A.2d 93, 98 
(Me. 1996). The ultimate question is 
whether the Defendant, with full 
knowledge of his legal rights, knowingly 
and intentionally relinquished them. State 
v. Meyers, 345 at 502 (citing Miller v. 
United States, 396 F.2d 492, 496 (8th 
Cir.1968). During the November 28, 2000, 
interview, at which the Defendant was 
advised of his Miranda rights and at which 
Attorney Smith was present, the parties 
agreed to the Bradford trip. 
Post Polygraph Statements 
*7 Without commenting on whether the Defendant 
was in custody or subject to interrogation after the 
police informed him that he had failed the 
polygraph examination the Court concludes, as 
discussed above, that the actual presence of attorney 
Smith rendered Miranda warnings unnecessary. 
Voluntary Statements 
The Defendant further claims that due to mental 
illness and a history of drug abuse the statements he 
made to police were not voluntary. The Court 
examines the totality of the circumstances when 
considering whether a defendant's statements are 
voluntary. State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, U 7, 772 
A.2d 1173. The Court considers both internal and 
external factors such as: the details of the 
interrogation; the duration of the interrogation; the 
location of the interrogation; whether the 
interrogation was custodial; whether there was a 
recitation of Miranda; the number of officer's 
involved; the persistence of police officers; police 
trickery or threats and promises; and the defendant's 
age, mental health, emotional stability and conduct. 
Id at K 9. The Court applies these factors to 
determine if the totality of the circumstances 
indicates the defendant's admissions were not the 
result of "his own free will and rational intellect." 
Id. The Court notes that the Defendant was not in 
custody for any crime relating to Cloak's murder, he 
approached the police to discuss cooperation, he 
requested certain police officers, even though not 
required the police advised him of his Miranda 
rights, and he had the assistance of his attorney 
throughout the process. In addition the Defendant 
was operating pursuant to two proffer agreements 
and the Court finds there were no additional 
promises, threats, or acts of coercion on the part of 
the police. As discussed above, the police did not 
interrogate the Defendant, were not confrontational, 
and did not coax the defendant into confessing. See 
State v. Cole, 1997 ME 112, 695 A.2d 1180 
(finding that although the police at times 
approached the interrogation in a confrontational 
manner and at times coaxed the defendant into 
confessing, the defendant's confession was still 
voluntary). 
The Defendant claims that his history of mental 
illness and drug abuse renders his statements 
involuntary. The Court has examined the transcripts 
and videotapes of the interviews and taken into 
account the expert testimony presented during the 
hearing in this matter. Four experts testified during 
the hearing, and this court finds and concludes that 
the opinion of Dr. Shetky, a psychiatrist, was the 
most compelling. Her opinion and the reasons for 
her opinion were more in line with the facts and 
images seen in the videotapes and the transcripts 
than the testimony of the experts presented by the 
defense. She opined that the mental health problems 
of the defendant did not render his statements to the 
police involuntary. Based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the Court concludes that the 
Defendant's history of drug abuse and mental illness 
did not render his statements involuntary. Again, the 
Defendant approached the police seeking to better 
his situation, requested the assistance of counsel, 
stopped the interviews at times to privately confer 
with his attorney, and acted in a rational, coherent 
manner throughout the process. See State v. 
Addington, 518 A.2d 449, 452 (Me 1986). The 
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State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant's statements were voluntary. 
*8 THE DOCKET ENTRY IS: 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby 
denied. 
The clerk is ordered to incorporate this decision 
into the docket by reference. 
Me.Super.,2003. 
State v. Alexandre 
Not Reported in A.2d, 2003 WL 21387159 
(Me.Super.) 
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